By Stanley R. Sloan. Mr. Sloan is a private consultant and Visiting Scholar at Middlebury
College who for over 30 years worked on issues of trans-Atlantic relations in the executive and
legislative branches of the U.S. government. He is currently writing a book entitled "The Trans-Atlantic Bargain Reconsidered."
Originally published in the Wall Street Journal Europe, February 21, 2001
Europeans want to form an "autonomous" defense capability and the new U.S. administration
wants to see its national missile defense plans go through with as little opposition as possible.
What to do? An idea has emerged since the meeting in Munich earlier this month between
politicians, officials and military experts: a "grand bargain" in which each side supports the other.
Sounds great, right? No. Consummating such a deal would be a disservice to the trans-Atlantic
relationship, giving a green light to unilateralist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic.
That is the last thing the Atlantic alliance needs at this potentially vulnerable moment in its history.
Rather than blindly supporting each other's plans, the Americans have a right to demand that the
European Union's new defense initiative does not split the alliance, and the Europeans should be
assured that America's national missile defense plan will also provide protection to the European
allies.
The trans-Atlantic relationship is founded not on Machiavellian manipulation of balance of power
relationships, as some of the potential deal makers apparently think. Rather, it is sustained by the
commitment of the partners to transform shared values into common interests and compatible
policies on a continuing basis. The end product usually is some sort of compromise between U.S.
and European preferences, but the process does not begin with the kind of crude horse-trading
now being suggested.
Good Intentions
The ongoing negotiations aimed at organizing the future NATO-EU relationship have been
difficult. They currently remain hung up over the question of whether or not the EU will need its
own separate defense-planning capacity or will rely on that already available in NATO. To be
sure, there is no reason to assume that a more coherent European defense role would necessarily
split NATO. But it needs to be done properly. With good intentions all around, a common
European security and defense policy can ensure better burden sharing across the Atlantic and
strengthen, not weaken, NATO.
Dealing with the national missile defense issue may be more difficult. However, an open and
constructive U.S.-European dialogue in NATO, as suggested by NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson, could narrow differences.
The Munich conference discussions demonstrated that, in spite of the close U.S.-European
relationship, serious mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings remain, distressingly so among
high level U.S. and European officials. Perhaps most importantly, the discussions revealed the
need to revitalize the foundations of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
For most Americans, NATO is the trans-Atlantic relationship. But that relationship is more than
just NATO, even though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has effectively carried most of
the burden of relations for more than 50 years. It is also more than the growing U.S. relationship
with the European Union.
The EU increasingly represents not only united European economic but also political and now
security views in dealings with the United States. But the EU does not yet include all European
democracies, and different views of Europe's future among its members suggest it will be years, if
not decades, before the EU equals "Europe" in all its aspects.
The Atlantic community represents a core of values and interests that is unique. The United States
has more in common with its trans-Atlantic allies -- from its historical roots to its contemporary
interests -- than with any other single nation or group of countries in the world. No single country
has as much in common with Europe or is more important to Europe than is the United States.
The United States and Europe will continue to fight over trade and economic issues. But, in spite
of predictions to the contrary, the end of the Cold War did not nullify their common interest in
resolving such conflicts successfully. The Western economic system thrives on competition. It is
constantly perturbed by the conflicts that arise out of such competition, but it survives because the
shared interests of the participants requires a constant process of resolving, or at least managing,
conflicts.
A New Treaty
The "grand bargain" that now is required between the United States and Europe is one that
reaffirms a community of values and interests among democratic states that must continue to
guide trans-Atlantic relations. While the Bush administration works on its missile-defense plans
and the EU members build their common security and defense capability, both should begin
preparation of a new Atlantic Community Treaty.
The new treaty should draw on the expressions of common values and shared interests articulated
in the 1949 Treaty of Washington that established NATO. It should reflect a contemporary
appreciation of those values and interests, and should include all members of and applicants for
membership in both the European Union and NATO. For those countries that might not be able to
join NATO or the EU for several years, membership in the new Atlantic Community would serve
as a bridge toward eventual seats in NATO and EU councils.
Reaffirmation of a commitment to community in the trans-Atlantic relationship would create the
atmosphere most conducive to resolution of U.S.-European differences over the European
Union's new role in defense. It would provide the best setting in which to discuss U.S. plans for a
national missile defense as well as a constructive framework for the management of future trade
and economic ties. And it would help close current organizational and membership gaps between
NATO and the EU without undermining either.
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