"EU military endorsed Rapid-reaction force would add to influence, study says"
Washington Times; Washington, D.C.; Apr 8, 2001; Louis R. Golino

The United States should welcome the European Union's efforts to establish a
rapid-reaction force because it will make Europe a better U.S. partner and help
promote a more balanced trans-Atlantic relationship, according to a new report from a
London think tank.

The report, "Europe's Military Revolution," argues that while the United States will
remain the senior partner within the Atlantic alliance, America should accord Europe
greater political weight if and when Europeans deliver on their promised military
capabilities.

"An alliance in which the Europeans feel that they are real partners, and in which the
Americans feel that they do not have to carry an unfair burden, would be the best basis
for their future relationship," it said.

The report by the London-based Center for European Reform (CER) was prepared by
Charles Grant, CER director; Christoph Bertram, director of Germany's largest foreign
policy think tank; and French analyst Gilles Andreani, a former head of policy planning
for the French Foreign Ministry.

The CER has close ties with the government of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. It
reportedly influenced Mr. Blair's 1998 decision to propose an EU defense initiative
focused on actual military capabilities rather than new institutions.

`SINGLE VOICE' SOUGHT

The report was issued March 1 during a private seminar in Brussels with the authors
and Javier Solana, the EU's foreign and security policy chief, and Chris Patten, the
European commissioner for foreign relations.

It says the mandate of these two EU officials overlaps too much, and having both
posts fragments policy making. To help establish an effective common foreign policy, it
suggests that these two positions be merged into one, which would be the single voice of
the EU abroad.

Until December 1998 when Mr. Blair and French President Jacques Chirac put
forward the EU defense plan, the EU had been exclusively and self-consciously a
civilian power. It was frequently referred to as a economic giant and a political pygmy.
But, say these writers, the European military revolution is raising Europe's global
profile and will force the EU to develop a military and security culture - something it
has lacked since its inception.

What is known as "the headline goal" refers to establishing by 2003 a rapid-reaction
force of corps size (60,000 troops) with naval and air support that can be deployed
within a month and sustained in the field for a year.

The CER analysis says that to achieve this objective, European governments will need
to overcome their tendency to devote inadequate resources to defense.

ADVICE ON DEFENSE FUNDS

It also maintains that Europeans should allocate what they do spend in a more rational
way. In particular, each state needs to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) on defense and devote a quarter of its defense expenditures on research
and development and procurement.

The authors suggest creation of an EU defense budget "to finance the cost of common
weapons programs, common capabilities or forces, and EU military missions." They
also argue that peer pressure can help encourage further European military reform and
make two suggestions toward this end.

One is to create a monitoring group to evaluate each nation's progress in achieving
defense reform; this would further the recent convergence of European military forces
and doctrines the report highlights.

The other is that "the EU's defense ministers should meet on their own at least twice a
year, as a Council of Defense Ministers."

Mr. Solana, the EU foreign and security policy chief, has also made the latter proposal
and argued that it is essential to a serious EU defense capability.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The report says that the planned EU defense role will require integration of the
intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the common European security policy.

This is necessary if the EU is to play to its comparative strength over other
international organizations. It alone possesses such a wide range of civil and military
instruments for responding to crises.

The authors say in this connection that EU institutions, especially the European
Commission, the EU's executive body, should not be excluded from EU defense
policy. The latter has been largely intergovernmental, that is, driven by the member
states of the EU.

They also argue in favor of strengthening and raising the profile of the EU's defense
institutions, especially the Political and Security Committee. This organization's mandate
is to provide political control and strategic guidance for EU crisis management.

The members of the European Parliament recently threatened to withhold funding for
these organizations unless they fall under the jurisdiction of the European Commission,
which would make them subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

U.S. CONCERNS CITED

Messrs. Grant, Bertram and Andreani also address long-standing U.S. concerns about
the EU's European Security and Defense Policy - in particular, that it might eventually
sideline NATO and challenge U.S. leadership of the alliance.

First, these analysts stress that the planned rapid-reaction force is modest. It is designed
to conduct small-scale humanitarian assistance, crisis management and peacekeeping
operations that affect European security more than that of the United States.

The Kosovo air campaign is often cited as an example of how the force would be used.

But the report says the planned force will be inadequate for such activity. Instead, it
would be suited to post-conflict peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions of the
type that NATO began conducting in Bosnia and Kosovo once a peace agreement
was signed.

The authors favor Europe taking full responsibility for peacekeeping in the Balkan
region. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Europeans perform poorly in this role,
they contend that in many cases Europeans are better suited to peacekeeping than
Americans because they are "more flexible and adaptable" and "less obsessed with
self-protection."

CASE FOR AUTONOMY

>From a U.S. government perspective, the most important issue is why Europeans need
the ability to act autonomously from NATO if the alliance remains the foundation of
their defense, as EU leaders regularly profess.

The writers respond with a series of arguments. One is that NATO needs to evolve to
better accommodate differing European and U.S. approaches to security issues.
Another is that: "Unless the European governments aspire to be able to act on their own,
they are likely to go only half way, believing that the U.S. will make up the
difference."

Third, the Europeans are seeking only a limited form of autonomy to increase the range
of options for crisis response within the trans- Atlantic security community. For
approximately the next 10 years, the report said, Europe will not be able to mount
major military operations without U.S. and NATO assistance, especially for strategic
intelligence, lift capability and secure communications.

A related U.S. concern has to do with military force planning. NATO's operational
planning is done through SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in
Mons, Belgium.

According to the report, Europeans have no intention of duplicating this facility, contrary
to many news accounts that appeared last year.

The authors say that for autonomous missions, the EU would either use SHAPE or an
existing European national or multinational headquarters for operational planning. The
EU will, however, have a small group of strategic planners, who set guidelines for
operational planners.

* Louis R. Golino is a Washington-based defense and foreign policy analyst.

Credit: SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES