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from
In the National Interest, March 12, 2003 Challenges to the Transatlantic Relationship March 12, 2003 The
ongoing discussion of transatlantic relations, especially as it has unfolded
in the pages of In the National Interest, is particularly disturbing
to those of us who believe that the transatlantic relationship remains
vitally important to both the United States and to Europe. Some shortsighted Americans say
France and Germany are no longer U.S. allies, but in fact are now enemies of
the United States. Meanwhile,
some equally myopic Europeans say they have more in common with Russia than
with the United States. On both
sides of the Atlantic, observers proclaim that NATO is dead, and paint dire
projections for the future.
(See, in particular, the contributions made by Hungarian Foreign
Minister Kovacs, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol2issue7/vol2issue7Kovacs.html,
of Bruno Tertrais, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol2issue7/vol2issue7tertrais.html,
and Nikolas Gvosdev, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol2issue6/vol2issue6gvosdev.html.) There
is a crisis in transatlantic relations, and that crisis is the result of
careless U.S. unilateralism combined with toothless European autonomy. The Bush Administration has managed
through its careless unilateral behavior to throw away most of the good will
generated by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. It has put in jeopardy the hard-won
consensus to expand NATO’s global role as agreed in Prague last
November. In response, the
government of France called for a united EU front against the U.S. approach
to Iraq, and argued against a formal NATO role in Afghanistan, indulging in
hollow “autonomous” behavior–perhaps understandable, but not helpful. Which United States? The United States has since World War II been the dominant force in U.S.-European relations, but the type of power it has projected has changed over the years. During the Cold War, U.S. power deterred military adventurism by the Soviet Union. Europeans, with the notable exception of France, tolerated the increasingly hegemonic role of the United States. Soviet power made it clear to most European countries that the largely benevolent U.S. hegemony was a small price to pay for a reliable security guarantee. The
United States, for its part, knew that democratic Europe was not only a
critical strategic asset in its superpower competition with the Soviet Union
but was also the main “prize” in the Cold War ideological competition.
In
the 1990s, the United States had the power and prestige to exert substantial
influence on most international events or issues, but its leaders were not
sure whether they wanted to exploit that position actively or to use it as a
shield behind which the country could retreat and deal with its domestic
issues. Bill Clinton rode into
office on a “domestic economy first” platform. But Clinton’s administration found itself unavoidably
leading the international community in the Balkans and, from time to time, falling
into the exceptionalism trap – for example when Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright proclaimed that the United States “stands taller and therefore can
see further” than other countries.
It
was with the advent of the Bush Administration, however, that the United
States began more actively to assert its hegemonic position. Candidate Bush had cautioned that the
United States should pursue a “modest” foreign policy. Once in office, however, his
administration moved unilaterally with a vengeance. On a wide range of issues, from
ballistic missile defense to ecological protection, it boldly rejected
international agreements when they did not fit administration interpretations
of U.S. interests. Following
the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the
administration appreciated the outpouring of international sympathy and
support but then adopted a strongly unilateral posture, telling the rest of
the world “you are either with us or against us” in the war on terror. In 2002, the administration began
marching alone down the road toward war against Iraq before realizing that
neither the American people nor U.S. allies would easily embrace war against
Iraq unless it were sanctioned by the international community. It was so
clear to most observers (and to all our allies) that the administration was
going to go to war with Iraq, no matter what. The administration’s eventual recourse to the UN Security
Council has therefore done little to build American international
credibility. Will
the United States – under George W. Bush or his eventual successor -- find a
tolerable balance between unilateral defense of U.S. interests on the one
hand and constructive collaboration with international friends and
institutions on the other? Or
will Washington simply push its way through future international issues,
perhaps sacrificing much of the moral authority that George W. Bush’s father
and other presidents have worked hard to sustain. Which
Europe? Just
as there is a question about what kind of United States will occupy the
American seat at the U.S.-European table, it is unclear what kind of Europe
will be available to sit across the way. In
1981, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, frustrated by the fact
that nobody and yet everybody spoke for Europe, asked half-seriously “What is
Europe’s telephone number?” Some would argue Kissinger’s question has now
been answered. The European
Union has a “High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy,”
Javier Solana, who in theory is the voice and face of the EU toward the
outside world. However, if the
outside world wants to talk about trade or economic and monetary issues, it
had better not talk to Solana.
Authority in this area is in the hands of the supranational EU
commission. And,
if you want to influence the actions of the members of the EU, you might make
some progress dealing with the capable Mr. Solana, but you had better also
talk to the governments of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and others,
without whose initiative and support the EU does nothing. Europe
remains a mixed media presentation, part supranational organization, part
united Europe, and very much still run by national governments, most of whose
roots and political power are sunk deeply into their domestic power bases
first and only secondarily in the “European idea.” Particularly
since the advent of the George W. Bush Administration, growing numbers of
Europeans have suggested that the unilateral behavior of the United States
should stimulate the process of European political unification. In fact, however, recent events have
demonstrated how far the European Union is from being “Europe.” And
so, just as there are questions about whether the United States will be a
benevolent hegemon or a unilateralist bully in its relationship with Europe,
it is uncertain what mix of supra-nationalism and nationalism will govern
Europe, and whether the “old” or “new” European attitudes will dominate.
What
now? In
these equations both the United States and its friends and allies in Europe
face important choices. The
United States faces the challenge of using its power in ways that reflect
U.S. values and draws on the American public's desire to cooperate with other
countries while not inspiring opposition by being too domineering. In other words, the United States
has to learn how to be a hegemon without acting like one. If
U.S. allies still believe that U.S. leadership is essential on many international
issues, as they apparently do, then their challenge is to express their
criticism of U.S. leadership style in terms that are appropriate for frank
and honest discussions among friends, and in ways that will promote
U.S.-European cooperation, not make it more difficult. The
bottom line is that the United States and Europe still need each other. As a
U.S.-European expert study group recently concluded, “Although the U.S. may
be able to win wars without significant allied contributions, it is unlikely
in many situations to be able to win the peace without military (and
non-military) assistance from European allies....” (See this report at http://www.ttc.org/CESDP/index.htm.) And, if Europeans look for allies
that broadly share European values and interests, most will conclude that the
United States, with all its flaws, will remain the most important and
reliable world partner for a more united Europe. Moreover, the international community needs this “crucial
couple” to find some form of marital harmony. Working together, the United States and Europe have the
wits and resources to deal with most international problems. In the absence of such cooperation –
as recently demonstrated over Iraq – the international community simply doesn’t
function very well. The sense of “community” among the transatlantic
nations has been the first victim of the crisis over Iraq. On the “day after Iraq,”
the United States and Europe will need to breathe new life into the sense of
common destiny among the Atlantic community of nations. For those who share this belief, the
time has come to start preparing a re-awakening of transatlantic good will
and cooperation. No matter how the Iraq issue is resolved, we
should now begin preparation of a new Atlantic Community Treaty, reaffirming
the broad area of U.S-European shared values and interests. The treaty would have both political
and functional goals.
Politically, such a major political act would shift the focus of
United States-European relations toward all that we have in common and away
from the exclusive focus on what divides us. Functionally, the treaty among all members of NATO and the
European Union would create a soft-power framework of cooperation to
complement the hard power frameworks of NATO and the EU’s Common European
Security and Defense Policy. This
will not be easy; attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic today make it even
more difficult. However, without
a renewed sense of common destiny, the United States would be weaker and less
predictable and Europe would be less confident and much less secure. Stanley R. Sloan is a visiting scholar at Middlebury College, Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative (www.AtlanticCommunity.org) and author of NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Trans-Atlantic Bargain Reconsidered (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). In 1999 he retired from his position as the Congressional Research Service senior specialist in International Security Policy after more than three decades of government service. |
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