December 11, 2003 A Policy of Reward and Retribution:

Bush administration shoots itself and

transatlantic relations in the foot

…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative

Just when it appeared the Bush administration was attempting to broaden the base of international support for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction, the administration unilaterally shot itself and US interests in the foot. George Bush was preparing to call the leaders of Germany, France and Russia to ask them to forgive old Iraqi debt when a directive from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz – cleared by a White House-led committee – was posted on the Pentagon web site specifying that only coalition members would be eligible to serve as prime contractors for US-financed reconstruction projects in Iraq. This eliminated the three countries Bush was about to ask for Iraqi debt relief and many others.

The predictable reaction was immediate. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer said that the move “wouldn’t be in line with the spirit of looking to the future together and not into the past.” The directive undermined the diplomatic efforts of Secretary of State Powell and special envoy and former Secretary of State James Baker to build international support for Iraqi debt relief. Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov reportedly reacted by opposing any forgiveness of Iraq’s $120 billion debt, $8 billion of which is owed to Russia. Ivanov noted “Iraq is not a poor country.” Before President Bush explained that Canada would not be excluded, Canada’s pro-American prime minister designate, Paul Martin, apparently astounded by the US action, said “I find it difficult to fathom. There is a huge amount of suffering going on there, and I think it is the responsibility of every country to participate in developing it.”

The directive apparently would not prevent non-coalition partner companies from serving as sub-contractors and therefore would not necessarily exclude them from participating in and profiting from reconstruction funds. The political damage done, however, is substantial. Iraqi reconstruction will suffer. US international influence will be further diminished.

The administration’s approach raises a number of questions about the administration’s foreign policy management: Why is policy toward Iraq reconstruction and allied relations apparently so poorly coordinated – isn’t that what a national security advisor is for? How can Secretary of State Powell continue to serve an administration that constantly undercuts its own diplomatic efforts, weakens America’s alliances, and tarnishes America’s international image?

Even more important, why does the administration insist on further damaging relations with good friends and allies? Does it not understand how such decisions will be received, or does it not care? The latter seems more likely, and so administration officials consciously set out to punish those governments that were skeptical about the administration’s rationale for going to war. The President claims the approach was designed to reward coalition partners who were putting lives on the line for the cause. If asked, leaders of the key partners – Britain, Italy and Spain, for example – undoubtedly would have wisely recommended against being rewarded in a way that only exacerbated transatlantic divisions.

In recent weeks it looked as if the administration might have learned how much the United States needs international cooperation to achieve its national objectives. But it has once again demonstrated that its base instincts are more inspired by reward (for coalition partners) and retribution (for war opponents) than reconstruction of Iraq or rehabilitation of US-allied relations.