The Global Setting for Transatlantic Relations

Speaking notes for a lecture

by

Marten van Heuven*

At Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont

January 13, 2006

Approach

It is a pleasure to be back in Middlebury College. Last year, I introduced this class to some concepts in the field of international relations: National interests, threats, principles and power. I understand those remarks are assigned reading, so I shall not repeat what I said then, save for the warning to fasten your seat belts.

Let me start with four points. First, my task is to provide a setting for your work on transatlantic relations, and in particular two institutional tools that shape this relationship – NATO and the European Union (EU). So I shall venture into the global context.

Second, my approach will be in the nature of an inquiry. It is my view, based on experience, that a healthy transatlantic relationship is a strong and abiding American interest. But my role here is not to tell you what to think, but rather to suggest how to think about this issue. You will want to reach your own conclusions.

Third, I shall suggest an approach for making sense of the global setting, which is a world that is interconnected and interdependent, though often not harmoniously.

Finally, I shall draw on several reputable sources for information and analysis which I encourage you to test for yourselves.

The text of my speaking notes for today will be available afterwards.

Key questions

I spent four years at the National Intelligence Council. The NIC, as it is generally called, is a small body of experts on geographic and functional issues. Their principal task is to prepare national intelligence estimates. These are long range assessments of possible developments such as, for example, the outlook for the Balkans, prospects for peace in the Middle East, and the future for energy supplies. The national intelligence officers are recruited from the intelligence community, other government departments, universities, and the private sector. They draw on the resources of the entire intelligence community. Under the new organization of the community, they work directly for the Director of National Intelligence. Their principal client is the President. Sometimes, the NIC gets it wrong, as it did on the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Sometimes, it gets it right, as it did on the breakup of Yugoslavia. The strength of the NIC, however, is not prediction – no one can predict events in the world. Rather, it lies in the ability of the NIC to illuminate trends and future eventualities, and to frame the issues ahead that policymakers must address.

One lesson I learned in those years is that, when you try and understand an issue, it is essential to get the question right. The price of not doing so, more often than not, is the wrong answer. So what are the questions that you should be addressing in this course?

Let me suggest two, one general; the other specific:

What is the global setting for transatlantic relations?

How can NATO and the European Union serve the American national interest?

You will be spending plenty of time on NATO and the EU with Professor Sloan. So I shall focus on the first question.

The confusion of events

Former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was asked once by a young reporter what were the greatest challenges he faced when in office. Not skipping a beat, MacMillan shot back :”Events, my dear man, events.”

So it is for most of us, who receive news in snippets, mostly devoid of context, and, increasingly, in polemical form. What are we to make of the raucous cacophony of information about events that seems to overwhelm us, leaving us floundering to understand, let alone deal with, global issues around us?

The issues are as numerous as they are weighty: The rise of China and India, growing Japanese nationalism, and the unresolved threat posed by North Korea are all affecting the traditional role of the United States as stabilizer in the Pacific (1).

In the United States, the Iraq war and hurricane Katrina have dented the credibility of the administration and damaged trust in the capacity of government to make and execute policy wisely (2). American politics has seen decreased bipartisanship and increased activism of the Christian right, causing former U.S. Senator and Episcopalian minister John C. Danforth to proclaim: “We reject the notion that religion should present a series of wedge issues useful at election time for energizing a political base” (3).

Europe continues to have trouble deciding where it is headed. Much of Europe, harbors profound disaffection with traditional organized churches, a trend reinforced by return to strict secular rules in the face of a growing Muslim presence. (4). In contrast, the Polish electorate is stressing the return to traditional catholic values (5). Respected former German Liberal party leader Otto Graf Lambsdorf worries about a “dispirited, quarrelsome Europe, at a crucial junction of its integration.” As to global trends, Lambsdorf calls for “vigilance on the part of our leaders and opinion makers, lest cooperation, all important in a globalized world, fall prey to the temptations of unilateralism, petty divisiveness and a shrunken common horizon.” France is the scene of a vivid political duel between two men –Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin – vying to succeed President Jacques Chirac. (6). In Germany, the process that has led to the installation of Angela Merkel as Chancellor has been judged to be “a mess” (7). There is deep pessimism in Germany over the economic future of Europe (8). French and Dutch electorates have derailed the project for a European constitution. EU countries have been deadlocked about its budget. The Economist concludes, ambiguously, that Europe’s demographic disaster is self-inflicted but not terminal (9).

The recent global strategic review of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London addressed evolving threats, rising powers, and systemic change, but without reaching conclusions. Significantly, it did highlight the lack of consensus on the basic rules governing international relations (10). The era of low cost petroleum is coming to an end (11). The potential threat of a pandemic raises the issue how to organize the response on a global scale.

These are but some of the issues that ask for our attention and which policymakers are obliged to cope with. How can we create some order out of this apparent confusion?

Drivers and trends

On three occasions the NIC has attempted to draw the global future. Global Trends 2015 – its second effort - identified seven key drivers of global change: demographics, natural resources and the environment, science and technology, the global economy and globalization, national and international governance, future conflict, and the role of the United States. The 2020 project takes these trends as point of departure for imaginative, global scenarios that represent plausible alternative futures (12).

The Project starts with the premise that “at no time since the foundation of the Western alliance systems in 1949 have the shape and nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux.” It concludes that the magnitude and speed of change resulting from a globalized world will be a defining feature of the world out to 2020. Other characteristics include the rise of new powers - China and India in particular – new challenges to governance, and a more pervasive sense of insecurity.

With new global actors, there will be radical change in the way we mentally map the world in 2020. The “arriviste” powers – China, India and others, such as Brazil and Indonesia – have the potential to render obsolete the old categories of East and West, North and South, aligned and non-aligned, developed and developing. Traditional geographic groupings will increasingly lose relevance in international relations. Competition for allegiance will be more open and less fixed than in the past.

Globalization – which I would define as unstoppable technology and information-driven interconnectedness - will be an overarching mega-trend, but its future is not fixed. The world economy is likely to grow impressively: by 2020, it is projected to be about 80 per cent larger than it was in 2000. The nation state will continue to be the dominant unit of the global order, but economic globalization and the dispersion of technologies, especially information technologies, will place enormous new strains on governance. Even as most of the world gets richer, globalization will profoundly shake up the status quo – generating enormous economic, cultural, and consequently political convulsions. New forms of identity politics centered on religious convictions will add pressure on governance. Political Islam will have a significant global impact, rallying dispersed ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends national boundaries.

With the international system undergoing profound flux, some of the institutions that are charged with managing global problems may be overwhelmed by them. Regionally based institutions will be challenged to meet the complex threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such post-World War II creations as the United Nations and international financial institutions risk sliding into obsolescence unless they adjust to profound changes taking place in the global system, including the rise of new powers and, I would add, unless they refocus on being effective.

Weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and youth bulges will align to create “a perfect storm” for internal conflict in certain regions.

The 2020 report concludes by extrapolating from these trends four possible – and not mutually exclusive – scenarios. They are not actual forecasts, but describe possible worlds ahead:

A Davos world, illustrating how economic growth, led by China and India, could reshape the globalization process, giving it more of a non-Western face and transforming the political playing field as well.

A Pax Americana, in which US predominance survives the radical changes in the global political landscape and fashions a new global order.

A new Caliphate, showing how a global movement fueled by radical religious identity could constitute a challenge to Western norms and values as the foundation of the global system.

A cycle of fear, highlighting how concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism increase to the point where intrusive security measures are taken to prevent outbreaks of deadly attacks, possibly introducing an Orwellian world.

The 2020 project anticipates that, by most measures – market size, single currency, skilled work force, stable democratic governments, and unified trade bloc – an enlarged Europe will be able to increase its weight on the international scene. The EU rather than NATO will increasingly become the primary institution for Europe. Europe’s strength could be in providing a model of global and regional governance for the rising powers. But in its current, enlarged state, the EU is a far cry from being a cohesive, global actor, except in the area of trade, where the EU Commission speaks for the EU countries with a single voice. Aging populations and shrinking work forces in most countries will have an important impact on the continent. Either European countries adapt their work forces, reform their social welfare, education and tax systems, and accommodate growing immigrant populations, or they face a period of protracted economic stasis.

The United States will be an important shaper of the international order in 2020. Washington will be increasingly confronted with the challenge of managing – at an acceptable cost to itself – relations with Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and others, absent a single overarching threat around which to build a consensus. But the United States will retain enormous advantages, playing a pivotal role across a broad range of issues- economic, political, technological and military – that no other state will match by 2020.

Finally, over the next fifteen years, the increasing centrality of ethical issues has the potential to divide world-wide politics and to challenge US leadership. These issues include environment and climate change, privacy, cloning and bio-technology, human rights, and the legal norms for regulating international conflict.

How the American electorate sees US interests.

Last year, I spent some time grappling with the difficulties of defining the national interest. I made the point that, on most issues of foreign policy, the American electorate is disposed to give the administration a wide berth. But the public does have opinions about foreign policy, and these can be measured. Public Agenda, a non-profit research organization founded by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and polling expert Daniel Yankelovich 30 years ago, has created a new Confidence in U.S. foreign policy Index, CFPI. This index is based on interviews and will be updated every six months. Yankelovich explains his project and the recent results in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs (13).

The first CFPI revealed that Americans take pride in some features of US foreign policy, such as helping others when disaster strikes. Improving U.S. intelligence operations and exercising tighter control on immigration, if effective, are seen as leading to improved security. Majorities approve of having a well-supplied military and want due attention to the war on terrorism. On the other hand, clear-cut majorities of Americans disapprove of some ways the government acts: Its perceived inability to keep American jobs from going overseas, its failure to keep illegal drugs from coming in, illegal immigration, and protection of the global environment.

Most of the time, the public’s views do not come into play much in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. But Yankelovich argues that there is a tipping point. This is reached when three factors coincide: The size of the public majority, the intensity of its opinions, and whether the public believes that the government is responsible for addressing them. He identifies three issues which, in his view, have reached the tipping point: The war in Iraq, illegal immigration, and U.S. relations with other states, especially Muslim countries. Yankelovich concludes that, together, these three issues evidence considerable unease, and he suggests that the American public is beginning to feel that Washington has put too much emphasis on military responses to foreign challenges, and that the diplomatic, economic, political and intelligence capabilities of the United States have neither received the attention they deserve nor have been deployed skillfully.

What strategy?

So if we have some idea what are our national interests, what strategy should we employ to pursue these interests? During the long period of the Cold War, the threat was clear: Soviet communism. So was the American strategy to counter that threat: Containment. When Soviet communism collapsed and the Soviet Union disappeared, so did the threat. But the United States – and, with it, the North Atlantic Alliance – did not come up with a strategy to deal with the new situation. The new situation eluded definition. Indeed, there was not even consensus on just what to call the new period we were entering upon. So we took shelter in the term “post Cold War era.” though vaguely realizing that these words did not form a useful basis for an agreed strategy for the new era. There were several attempts at defining a new strategy: Assertive multilateralism, democratic engagement, enlargement, mutualism. None of these terms, however, captured the imagination of the American people and none gained political currency.

The first administration of President George W. Bush entered office without much in the way of new ideas about strategy. Nine eleven changed that. The national security strategy of the United States that emerged after the attack called for American assertiveness abroad to strengthen democracy, it questioned the utility of arms control agreements, it called for American military supremacy, and it declared that America will take preventive military action in cases where its vital interests are regarded as in danger. The strategy looked for support from the international community, but made clear that the United States will not be hampered by the need for international approval to do what it considers necessary in its interests (14). When President Bush took the oath of office for his second term, he pledged his administration to the extraordinary goal of “ending tyranny in the world”. The reach of this strategy has not enjoyed universal support. At home, Americans are but vaguely aware of this extension of Wilsonianism, and of the costs implementation of this strategy will entail. Abroad, the strategy – though welcomed in principle by some – has encountered skepticism about its wisdom and feasibility.

Now Richard Haass, a former colleague at the State Department and currently President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has made another try (15). He calls for a strategy of integration, arguing that the United States should package American efforts with other world powers, and build effective international arrangements to take collective actions. Those relationships would be expanded to include other countries and people. Haass argues, further, that we should offer rogue states the advantages of integration into the global community in exchange for fundamentally changing their ways. Haass concludes that integration reflects existing international realities, addresses American national security challenges, sets forth ambitious but achievable national security objectives and provides “first-order” guidance that policymakers can consistently apply.

Perhaps Haass’ ideas will fall on fertile ground, for they are based on a true reading of the elements which constitute the position in which the United States finds itself today – an overstretched military, unacceptable costs, alienated would-be partners and a curtailed appetite of the American people for a missionary foreign policy. Former U.S. Ambassador to the EU Stuart Eizenstat takes Haass’ proposals one step further. He suggests transatlantic economic integration through a new Atlantic Charter (16). Here at Middlebury, Professor Stanley Sloan’s thoughts run in the same direction.

If integration becomes U.S. foreign policy doctrine, it is not hard to imagine that this could also become the doctrine for the countries of Europe, and quite possibly others, thus providing a welcome common starting point for assessing the world situation and the tasks ahead.

Key elements of the transatlantic relationship

Here is my snapshot of the European side of the transatlantic relationship. I admit it is bearish, though I should note that many of my American colleagues with whom I exchange ideas on this issue tend to be even more bearish. Professor Tony Judt, however, is more sanguine. His recent work, entitled “Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945,” ends with the speculation that, because of Europe’s skills with soft power, the 21^st century could be the century of Europe. Many knowledgeable observers, on the other hand, tend to give a downbeat assessment of the prospects for Europe (17).

Economic sclerosis. As my RAND colleague Bob Levine never tires of pointing out, the root cause of the current European malaise is economic stagnation. He advocates pragmatic use of monetary and budgetary stimuli (18). On the other side of the Atlantic, these views are heard from Giorgio LaMalfa, Italy’s minister for European affairs: “Only economic growth and the steady creation of jobs can revive public trust in the European Union and make further enlargement acceptable” (19). The Eurozone economies will continue to stagnate unless they loosen labor markets, reduce taxes, and encourage innovation.

Fear of immigration. There is a sense of helplessness in dealing with the problem – which appears in different forms in different EU countries – of assimilating immigrant minorities. Perhaps the Haass prescription of integration has applicability also in this volatile domain. But integration raises the issue of identity. Look at The Netherlands. Just what sort of Dutchmen should the Muslim population aspire to be, the squeaky-clean upstanding, frugal, solid citizens of the countryside, or the easy-going, cosmopolitan, drug-tolerant bon vivant citizens found in the major cities?

Lingering instability. In my view, Europe today is not stable. The recent U.S. - led efforts to rectify imperfections in the Dayton agreement with respect to Bosnia, and the negotiations aiming at resolution of the status of Kosovo, have reduced the threat of armed conflict in the Balkans. But many European countries remain afflicted by dysfunctional political party systems that increasingly are seen by their publics as unresponsive to their concerns. Moreover, within the EU, there is deep uncertainty about the structure and nature of its future, as well as fundamental disagreement about enlargement and the EU budget.

Weak leadership. This condition affects the major EU countries, with the possible exception of Germany, where a new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has just taken the helm. The nature of her coalition government suggests major difficulties ahead in securing progress away from economic stagnation, though the coalition may have a better chance to achieve some labor market reform than the previous Social Democratic government. As to foreign policy, Merkel’s approach holds promise for a constructive German role as the key member country of the EU.

As to the United States, I see several challenges ahead. I do not discuss Canada, not because it is not a key country, which it is, but because a discussion of its role, only weeks before a national election, would take us too far from our theme.

Rediscovering domestic balance. Sharp policy disagreements on issues of domestic social, political and economic issues have split the country and made governance difficult. We have huge deficits, an eroding infrastructure, uneven education and a large poor class with little hope of betterment. Will we be able to address these problems? And will the American political process see a return toward bipartisanship when faced with major threats, as was the case with the bipartisan 9/11 Commission?

Bounding the reach of foreign engagement. Will the current and future administrations sustain a policy of supporting and defending the emergence of freedom and democracy everywhere abroad? It is beyond doubt that the United States will be a major player on the global scene as far ahead as can be measured. But there will be limits to an approach that implies heavy U.S. intervention, not least American public opinion.

Matching ends and means. How will the U.S. reconcile its interests with its means? In an increasingly globalized world, cooperation with like-minded partners seems inescapable, but that will require give as well as take.

Leadership. Is the United States going to be able to provide leadership in a world in which everything seems to be in flux and there is urgent need for agreed and institutional arrangements that will produce workable policies? I tend to be optimistic. We know that the American public favors cooperation with others. America is the home of a well informed and trained cadre of domestic and foreign policy experts. They have made it possible for the United States to provide great leadership in the past. They have come up with ingenious organizational arrangements. The country is capable, given the right circumstances, of doing so again.

Summing up.

Finally, as you approach the question how NATO and the EU can serve American interests, three things are worth keeping in mind.

First, Europe is no longer the center of world politics. The Middle East and East Asia are where the action is, and these areas will command priority attention in Washington.

Second, Europe and the United States do not share an agreed threat assessment. Absent such an agreed assessment, common policies will be difficult to put together.

My third point, however, is that Europe and the United States share vital, long-term interests. This point has been made eloquently by Timothy Garton Ash (20). It has been argued extensively by Professor Simon Serfaty (21), and many others. These converging interests constitute a solid basis for cooperation on key issues such as economic growth, political stability, bringing along the less advantaged parts of the world, as well as on counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism

Transatlantic cooperation requires institutional forms, and with this conclusion I hand you back to Professor Sloan, who is an expert in the labyrinths of the EU and NATO.

*Marten van Heuven is a retired US foreign service officer, former National Intelligence officer for Europe, a senior consultant at the RAND Corporation, a Distinguished Lecturer at the Foreign Service Institute, and a director of the Atlantic Council of the United States. These are the personal views of the speaker.

The author acknowledges with deep appreciation the valuable critiques of and comments on an earlier draft by his RAND Corporation colleagues James Dobbins, Robert A. Levine, Gregory Treverton, Charles Wolf, Jr., and of Samuel F. Wells Jr., Associate Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC.

Notes:

1. For an insightful commentary, see William Pfaff, “Changing Asia,” International Herald Tribune, September 17-18, 2005, page 7.

2. For a sharp critique, see “Hard Bigotry of No Expectations,” Editorial, The New York Times, September 25, 2005.

3. “Onward, moderate Christian soldiers,” International Herald Tribune, June 22, 2005, page 8.

4. Otto Graf Lambsdorf, “Three corners of the world try to find their bearings,” International Herald Tribune, June 22, 2005, page 8.

5. Graham Bowley, “Poles on ramparts of EU culture war,” International Herald Tribune, November 24, 2005, page 1.

6. John Vinocur, “Sarkozy vs. Villepin: Dueling to debilitation,” International Herald Tribune, November 1, 2005, page 2.

7. Editorial, The International Herald Tribune, November 3, 2005, page 6.

8. “Germany and the Future of the Transatlantic Economy, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Bulletin, Volume XVI, No. 2, August 2005.

9. The Economist, October 22, 2005, page 58.

10. IISS News, Autumn 2005.

11. Robert L. Hirsch, ‘The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil Production,” The Atlantic Council of the United States, Bulletin, Volume XVI, No.3, October 2005.

12. “Mapping the Global Future,” National Intelligence Council, NIC 2004-13, www.cia.gov/NIC_globaltrend2020html.

13. “What Americans Really Think About U.S. Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, No. 5, September/October 2005, page 2.

14. The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C., September 17, 2002.

15. “Don’t alienate. Integrate,” International Herald Tribune, November 9, 2005, page 8.

16. Centerpoint, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Newsletter, November 2005, page 3.

17. See Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, ” The End of Europe?,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, No. 6, November/December 2005, page 55.

18. Robert A. Levine, “It’s the economy, stupide!,” International Herald Tribune, June 8, 2005.

19. For the cure, follow the money,” International Herald Tribune, July 9-10, 2005, page 6.

20. “What Future for the West?,” Sixth Gerd Bucerius Lecture, June 29, 2005, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. Bulletin 37, Fall 2005, page 27.

21. The Vital Partnership, Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.

Final, as delivered 1/13/06