“EU-NATO RELATIONS AFTER THE RIGA SUMMIT”

Speaking notes for a presentation by Zacharias Giakoumis* at the 16^th Economic Forum in Krynica, Poland (8 September 2006).

It is a great honor to be among such distinguished panelists and have the opportunity to express my personal views on the issue of EU-NATO cooperation and transatlantic relations.

What I am intending to do is firstly to outline the different current thoughts on EU-NATO cooperation among the EU Member States. Secondly I shall pinpoint this divergence of thoughts, on the practical level, touching upon to the current stalemate, as regards the restricted agenda on the EU-NATO officials meetings in Brussels. Lastly, I will try to express some thoughts, regarding the political substance of the future of EU-NATO relations.

1. Going straightly to the first part, as regards the EU perspectives on EU-NATO cooperation, I cannot but repeat the very well known differentiation between Atlanticists and Europeanists. Although it is rather risky to put different national policies in neat boxes, it is my impression that, in general terms, this categorization is still the most applicable, without neglecting ofcourse the case of countries like Germany, which seems to be trying today to find a new balance between the two organizations. At any case, it is essential to stress that EU Member States are not adopting “one dimensional” policies, considering the developments on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO as a “zero sum game”.

A) On the side of the Atlanticists, the main desire is for development of an ESDP that is linked, with one way or another, with the Atlantic Alliance. Hence, some of their main objectives, as regards EU-NATO cooperation, are: reinforcement of communication channels and establishment of new ones (formal or informal); compatibility in the fields of strategic planning (for example, compatibility between European Security Strategy – NATO Strategic Concept, as well as between EU’s Comprehensive Planning Concept and NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance); and compatibility in rapid reaction (EU Battlegroups-NATO Response Force).

B) From their side, the Europeanists, believe that the development of ESDP capabilities, parallel and complementary to NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication, is an absolute necessity. Today, their rhetoric seems to be strengthened by ESDP’s “success story” (more than 10 autonomous operations worldwide), while the particular case of the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia, where a specifically EU-led operation was requested by the Indonesians, is becoming an additional “asset” in this respect. For this reason, the Europeanists are stressing that the EU should possess the necessary military capabilities in order to handle these tasks without being dependent to NATO or seem to be acting for it.

Does this mean that the Europeanists are trying, through ESDP development, to balance against NATO and the US? Notwithstanding the affirmative answer of many US and European commentators, I consider this “catchy” question to be irrelevant. And this is because ESDP and NATO are not comparable and my conviction is that they will never be. In this respect, it is relevant and useful, in order to understand the Europeanists true rationale, to quote a line from a recent article of Daniel Keohane from the London-based “Centre for European Reform”, as regards the main proponents of Europeanism: “The French seem to worry that the EU defence is a delicate flower which risks being squashed in the embrace of a military giant such as NATO” Source: Keohane, Daniel (2006), Unblocking EU-NATO cooperation, CER Bulletin , Issue 48, June/July 2006 (http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/48_keohane.html)

2. Moving to the next part of my presentation, I would like to underline the current stalemate on formal meetings between EU-NATO representatives in Brussels. This situation is indicative of the different perceptions within the EU that I have mentioned before.

Currently, under the framework of Political and Security Committee – North Atlantic Council meetings, the ambassadors of the two organizations are discussing only “joint EU-NATO operations”, of which there’s only one-operation ALTHEA in Bosnia. In addition, NATO-EU capability group is the only forum that allows for the formal exchange of views on various capability issues. The obvious reason behind the limited agenda of these meetings is a dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. The government of Turkey, based on a December 2002 agreement, objects to Cyprus and Malta sitting in on EU-NATO meetings because the two countries are not members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. However, the situation becomes more complex when Turkey is objecting to the transmission of certain documents to these two countries, claiming that they contain sensitive security data that cannot be accessed by countries that do not have a security agreement with NATO. As a consequence, some countries like Greece, France and Belgium object to putting on the agenda of PSC-NAC meetings issues like terrorism, Darfur or Afghanistan, because the appropriate decisions should be taken by all EU-Member States and not by EU-23.

In this case, the formula of informal meetings between the two organizations Secretariats, or between the European Commission with NATO’s Secretary General are not viewed positively, not only by the two above-mentioned micro-countries, but from others as well, since they are not in place to know what is being discussed, let alone the possibility of setting dangerous precedents.

Nevertheless, as a result, we are witnessing a ludicrous situation, where institutional and practical reasons are putting burning issues of international security out of the table of these important meetings, between the two organizations, in Brussels.

3. Moving to the third and last part of my presentation, I would like to express some thoughts, as regards the political substance of this debate.

First of all, it is useful to remember that, when talking about EU-NATO cooperation, we are basically talking about EU-US relations. Accordingly, it is also useful to stress that a discussion for a more ambitious agenda as regards EU-NATO cooperation, similar to the one we are having today, would have been out of the table four years before, on the eve of the US operation in Iraq. At that time, US Secretary of Defence divided European countries into “Old” and “New” Europe, while NATO seemed to be considered almost useless by the US.

-Hence, an evident question that comes to my mind is whether the notorious 2002-2003 transatlantic rift now belongs to the past?

Personally, I would say yes, the current state-of-affairs reaffirms what many commentators have stressed as “transatlantic rapprochement”.

-More importantly, another, second, question is following: Is the current transatlantic rapprochement likely to be a lasting trend?

I do not think that there is anybody that can give a clear answer to this. And this is simply because nobody can be sure whether the US turn to its European Allies is a choice of necessity or a choice of real, enduring alliance.

-However there is much to be said in the third and final question that emerges from the second one expressed above: What kind of steps should we follow in order to establish a solid and enduring EU-NATO cooperation?

My impression is that the problems mentioned before, the recent transatlantic traumas and the so far unclear US motives for re-embracing Europe are calling for a less ambitious but more functional cooperation, where careful work should be done on the institutional relations matters for over passing the current stalemate.

To conclude, redefining the relationship towards a more modest but also more pragmatic framework does not exclude future ambitious plans for EU-NATO cooperation and transatlantic relations. However, it is essential that small, concrete steps should be taken first, in order to set a stable and fully regulated framework that will allow, in the future, more ambitious ideas to be materialized, instead of failing and causing even greater disappointment to both sides.

*: Zacharias Giakoumis is a graduate of the Universities of Macedonia (Greece), Bath (UK) and the Institut d’ Etudes Politiques de Paris (France). He continued his research at the Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU Council’s Political and Security Committee and he is now working in the European Parliament, in Brussels.