|
U.S. Hegemony
and European Autonomy: Challenge to the Transatlantic Relationship [Notes for
presentation at the German Council on Foreign Relations, 2/10/2003] by Stanley R. Sloan
Today's discussion of transatlantic relations is particularly disturbing.
Some conservative Americans say France and Germany are no longer US allies,
but in fact are now enemies of the United States. Meanwhile, some in Europe
say they have more in common with Russia than with the United States. On both
sides of the Atlantic, observers say that NATO is dead, and paint dire
projection for the future of transatlantic relations. I hope and believe the doubters are all wrong, and that the damage
recently done can be repaired. But the repair job will not be easy, will require
patience, and may not begin until there is a changed leadership philosophy on
the US side. The greatest danger to US-European relations today, which I have warned
about for many years, is the combination of toothless European autonomy and
careless American unilateralism. The Bush Administration has managed, through its careless unilateral
behavior to throw away all the good will generated by the September 11, 2001
attacks on the United States, and now to have put in jeopardy the new
consensus on NATO's global role agreed in Prague last November. In response, the government of France, called for a united EU front
against the US approach to Iraq indulging in toothless "autonomous"
behavior, the European response to American unilateralism - perhaps
understandable, but not helpful. To put recent events in perspective, it should be noted that for more than
one half century, the United States and its European partners have suffered
and survived one "crisis" after another. Today, the United States and the members of the European Union face a new
crisis. This one is based in part on the challenges of dealing with an
international system in which the old threat from the Soviet Union has
disappeared, only to be replaced by an international terrorist campaign
against the West. The Soviet threat, for the most part, had a unifying effect on the
transatlantic allies. The shadowy and yet formidable challenge of
international terrorism, however, has divided the Euro-Atlantic allies over
the sources of terrorism and the appropriate responses. As a consequence, international terrorism and the related issue of what to
do about Iraq, has become the main external factor affecting relations
between the United States and the Europeans. But it is factors internal to
US-European relations that may in fact pose the most fundamental challenge to
the transatlantic alliance. Diverging world roles and perspectives raise the
question of whether the United States and the members of the European Union
are drifting apart and perhaps moving toward a transatlantic divorce. Which United States? Which Europe? One of the difficulties in discussing the relationship between the United
States and Europe is that the personas of both are constantly changing,
forcing continual reassessment of how the most recent changes will affect
U.S.-European relations. The United States: benign or menacing hegemon? The United States has since World War II been the dominant force in U.S.-European relations. During the Cold War, U.S. power deterred military adventurism by the Soviet Union. Europeans, with the notable exception of France, tolerated the
increasingly hegemonic role of the United States. Soviet power made it clear
to most European countries that the largely-benevolent U.S. hegemony was a
small price to pay for a reliable security guarantee. The United States, for its part, knew that democratic Europe was not only
a critical strategic asset in its superpower competition with the Soviet
Union but was also the main "prize" in the Cold War ideological
competition. At the end of the Cold War, some observers suggested that the United
States should lay claim to its hard-won position as global hegemon, and reap
the rewards of a dominant international position. Others suggested the Cold
War victory had earned the United States the right to "come home"
and tend to the needs of its people. For most of the 1990s, this dichotomy left the United States in the
position of a passive hegemon, or "reluctant sheriff," as Richard Haas
put it. (Haas, representing the Bush Administration recently at the 2003
annual Davos meeting, had a harder time explaining the strong-armed sheriff.)
In the 1990s, the United States had the power and prestige to exert
substantial influence on most international events or issues, but its leaders
were not sure whether they wanted to exploit that position actively or to use
it as a shield behind which the country could retreat and deal with its
domestic issues. The administrations of President Bill Clinton showed flashes
of unilateral behavior, for example at the Denver economic summit, the NATO
enlargement summit at Madrid, and when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
proclaimed that the United States "stands taller and therefore can see
further" than other countries. But it was with the advent of the Bush administration that the United
States began more actively to assert its hegemonic position. Candidate Bush
had cautioned that the United States should pursue a "modest"
foreign policy. Once in office, however, his administration moved
unilaterally on many fronts in support of its policy preferences. On a wide
range of issues, from ballistic missile defense to ecological protection, it
rejected international agreements when they did not fit administration
interpretations of U.S. interests. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001,
the administration appreciated the outpouring of international sympathy and
support but then adopted a strongly unilateral posture, telling the rest of
the world "you are either with us or against us" in the war on
terror. In 2002, the administration began marching alone down the road toward war
against Iraq before realizing that neither the American people nor U.S.
allies would support war against Iraq unless it were sanctioned by the
international community. The question is whether the Bush administration's strong go-it-alone
inclination an aberration, or a sign of things to come? Will U.S.
unilateralism finally provide the impetus for the unification of Europe,
leading U.S.-European relations down a rocky road of competition and
conflict, as some analysts have suggested? Or will the United States, under
George W. Bush or his successor, find a balance between unilateralism and international
cooperation that strengthens U.S.-European cooperation? What Europe? Just as there is a question about what kind of United States will occupy
the American seat at the U.S.-European table, it is unclear what kind of
Europe will be available to sit across the way. In 1981, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, frustrated by the fact
that nobody and yet everybody spoke for Europe, asked half-seriously
"What is Europe's telephone number?" Some would argue Kissinger's
question has now been answered. The European Union has a "High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy," Javier Solana,
who in theory is the voice and face of the EU toward the outside world.
However, if the outside world wants to talk about trade or economic and monetary
issues, it had better not talk to Solana. Authority in this area is in the
hands of the supranational EU commission. And, if you want to influence the actions of the members of the EU, you
might make some progress dealing with the capable Mr. Solana, but you had
better also talk to the governments of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy
and others, without whose initiative and support the EU does nothing. Europe remains a mixed media presentation, part supranational
organization, part united Europe, and very much still run by national
governments, most of whose roots and political power are sunk deeply into
their domestic power bases first and only secondarily in the "European
idea." It is possible that the EU's constitutional convention now being led by
former French Prime Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing will change all of
this. The members of the EU could agree to move decisively toward a truly
united Europe. They won't, but the constitutional convention will likely give
the Union a more unified appearance and help reform the EU decisionmaking
process - not inconsiderable accomplishments. Particularly since the advent of the George W. Bush administration,
growing numbers of Europeans have suggested that the unilateral behavior of
the United States should stimulate the process of European political
unification. In fact, however, recent events have demonstrated how far the
European Union is from being "Europe." To the extent that there has been unity, it has been in the belief that
the issue should be processed through the United Nations Security Council; a
preference that Great Britain helped convince the Bush administration finally
to embrace (albeit without much enthusiasm and now perhaps with some
regrets). And so, just as there are questions about whether the United States will
be a benevolent hegemon or a unilateralist bully in its relationship with
Europe, it is uncertain what mix of supra-nationalism and nationalism will
govern Europe. Of course, in these equations the United States and the members of the
European Union have choices to make. The United States must decide what blend
of unilateralism and cooperation best serves its long-term national
interests. The EU members will have to decide to what extent they need an
even-more unified front toward the outside world and to what degree they want
to preserve national options, particularly in foreign and defense policy. The
choices made will determine the quality of U.S.-European relations in the
years to come. Why Does it Matter? For over 50 years, the United States, Canada and their European allies
have taken the Euro-Atlantic alliance and the "transatlantic link"
for granted. It has been a basic assumption of our foreign and defense
policies. At the dawn of the 21st century, however, a new period of
questioning has begun. Americans ask: if the United States is the world's
only superpower, what do weak-kneed, argumentative, legalistic Europeans have
to offer to U.S. interests? Europeans ask: if Europe is on its way to unity,
with most European countries on board, why should Europe defer to rude,
reckless, impetuous Americans? U.S.-European relations in caricature The American side of this debate now finds articulate Euro-skeptics on the
rhetorical offensive. One such commentator, Walter Russell Mead, has painted
a picture of the relationship straight out of a classic American situation
comedy ("The Andy Griffith Show"), writing: “When Jacksonian America does think about Europe, it sees what Sheriff
Andy of Mayberry saw in Barney Fife - a scrawny, neurotic deputy whose good
heart was overshadowed by bad judgment and vanity. The slow-talking, solid
Andy tolerated Barney just fine, but he knew that Barney's self-importance
would get him into one humiliating scrape after another.” Another prominent commentator, Robert Kagan, argues that the success of
the European integration process, creating a zone of peace and cooperation
among countries that had warred for centuries, has also given birth to a
"non-use of force ideology." According to Kagan, "This is what
many Europeans believe they have to offer the world: not power, but the
transcendence of power." Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld capped off the caricature commentary when he
divided US European allies into those in "old Europe" who opposed
US Iraq policy and those in "new Europe" who supported it. One European commentator says that Kagan is "absolutely right"
in judging that "Americans and Europeans no longer share a common
'strategic culture.'" Peter van Ham points out that "...for
non-Americans, this is gradually becoming a world where the US acts as
legislator, policeman, judge and executioner. America sets the rules by its
own behaviour, judges others without sticking to these rules itself...." Such broad caricatures have recently dominated discussion of U.S.-European
relations. They lead all-too-easily to the conclusion that the United States
and Europe are drifting apart. There is, of course, evidence of drift and division to support these
approaches. Nation states tend to use the instruments of statecraft available
to them. What instruments they develop and fund is at least somewhat
dependent on what their history has taught them. The history of the Second World War taught Europe that military conflict
is to be avoided at all cost. Meanwhile, the United States came away
believing that appeasement of dictators only whets their appetite for
conquest. During the Cold War, West European nations learned that putting aside old
antagonisms allowed them to build a prosperous, stable community (the EU).
Meanwhile, deterring and finally defeating the Soviet Union in the Cold War
reinforced the American conviction that the demonstrated willingness to use
force is necessary in dealing with potentially aggressive dictatorial
regimes. However, even given the validity of these observations, there is more to
be said. Ties that bind... First, there is the simple fact that the United States, Canada and the
members of the European Union share political systems built on the values of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Granted, this does not
mean that these broad values are practiced similarly in all Euro-Atlantic
nations. There is no one democratic formula for solving the socio-economic problems
of modern societies. European countries have in general chosen paternalistic
approaches to social welfare, making the government the key agent in
providing a social security safety net. The United States leaves more to the
states and to private initiative. The costs and benefits of the different approaches can be argued
endlessly, but the most important reality is that, ultimately, the choices
are made democratically. The belief in and practice of democracy remains an
important part of the foundation for the Euro-Atlantic community. In addition to shared political values, the United States and EU member
states support market based economic systems in which competition drives the
market but is governed by democratically approved rules and regulations.
Neither the United States nor Europe allow completely free competition, and
neither is fully effective in regulating commercial practices in a way
consistent with societal values (witness the 2002 corporate and financial
scandals in the United States). But both the American and European systems try to balance the rights of
the individual with the rights of society. The bias tilts toward individual
liberty in the United States and toward social responsibility in Europe, but
the balance is subject to democratic change and control on both sides of the
Atlantic. Moreover, European and American market economies are the essential core of
the global economic system. Along with Japan, they are the main engines of
international trade and investment, and it is therefore in their mutual
interest to cooperate to make the system work. The facts are all quite familiar. The economic relationship between the
United States and the European Union is the largest in the world. The EU is
the largest U.S. trade partner when goods and services are added up. The
members of the EU have over $800 billion of direct investment in the United
States. The United States has over $573 billion invested in EU states. The EU
and the United States together account for more than 30 percent of world
trade and represent almost 60 percent of the industrialized world's gross
domestic product. These numbers and ratios will continue to grow. At the end of the Cold War, some observers judged that the Soviet threat
had imposed a discipline on transatlantic trade and financial relations that
would disappear in the post-Cold War era. The United States and Europe have continued to struggle with a variety of
trade issues, as they did during the Cold War, but such differences have not
shaken the foundations of the relationship. This is so because even though
the system stimulates and encourages competition it also ceases to function
effectively unless conflicting interests are eventually reconciled. In spite
of continuing differences and the absence of a Cold War threat, the United
States and Europe remain committed to resolving their trade and financial
differences in ways that balance costs and benefits over time. At the heart of the "realist" or "Jacksonian"
projection of doom and gloom for transatlantic relations is the view that the
U.S.-European security relationship is becoming irrelevant, NATO is dead, and
the European Union will never muster enough political will and resources to
become a significant military player alongside the United States. There is a growing gap between U.S. and European deployed military
capabilities. European states have simply not spent enough since the end of
the Cold War to keep up with the U.S. Revolution in Military Affairs. What
they have spent has not always been spent well, maintaining military
structures and equipment more appropriate for the Cold War strategic
environment than for likely 21st century conflicts. -During the
Cold War, the gap between U.S. and European military capabilities produced
different preferences for international problem solving. Now, the even-bigger
gap yields even more dramatic differences. However, it is possible to carry the gap projection too far, as Kagan and other have done. Although the European military modernization picture is certainly bad, it is not beyond repair. Europe needs to invest much more in defense, but the major European
military establishments intend to be able to conduct future operations on a
US-style high tech battlefield. France, the UK, and other European states have scheduled improvements in
communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, all weather
precision weaponry, strategic mobility, and force projection over the next 15
years. If these improvements are carried out, they should produce European
forces that are more capable of conducting operations in a great variety of
battlefield conditions in coalition with the United States and, to a lesser
extent, on their own if necessary. Why should the United States want the Europeans to make this effort?
Perhaps the most fundamental reason is that the American people do not want
their government to be the world's only policeman. U.S. public opinion
surveys for over a decade have shown the American people believe the United
States should help maintain international peace, but should share such
burdens and responsibilities with friends and allies. This same attitude
shows up in the preference of the American people to wage war against Iraq
with a UN mandate rather than without. As a U.S.-European expert study group (in which I participated) recently
concluded, "Although the U.S. may be able to win wars without
significant allied contributions, it is unlikely in many situations to be
able to win the peace without military (and non-military) assistance from
European allies...." The Future of U.S.-European Relations Toward the end of 2002, the United States and the members of the European
Union made important decisions affecting U.S.-EU ties and the institutional
framework that supports Euro-Atlantic relations. Summit meetings of both NATO
and the European Union opened the door for many additional countries to join
the two organizations, moving toward the point where most European nations
will be members of one or both of the organizations. Enlargement of Euro-Atlantic Community In recent years the members of NATO and the European Union have struggled with the question of how and when to admit new members. The decisions have been complicated by the fact that most of the candidates are not yet ideally prepared for membership in either organization. On the other hand, NATO and EU members felt an obligation to wipe out the
old lines dividing Europe by inviting new democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe to join. NATO's November decisions in Prague will bring seven
additional countries into the alliance (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania). The EU's enlargement decision, taken in Copenhagen in December, could
bring ten more countries into the EU (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia)
by May 1, 2004. The combination of the NATO and EU enlargement processes, if consummated
in the next few years with successful referenda and ratification in member
and applicant countries, would bring the Euro-Atlantic institutional
structure much closer to representing "a Europe whole and free"
that George W. Bush's father had set as a goal in May 1989. The process could also have unintended consequences. Some observers have
speculated that the enlargement of the EU to include many of the new
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe will make it virtually impossible
for the EU to adopt an anti-U.S. stance in future years. On the eve of the EU's enlargement decision, Karsten Voigt, the German
foreign ministry's coordinator for German-American relations, observed
"Any concept attempting to define the EU as an organization that is
basically against the United States is no longer able to muster a majority.
That temptation is finished." This does not mean that "new Europe" will turn the EU into a
yes-man for U.S. interests. But it does mean that future EU criticism of the
United States will in all likelihood remain framed by the desire to ensure a
constructive Euro-Atlantic dialogue. Institutional reform? Both NATO and EU enlargements pose important decisionmaking issues for the
respective organizations. Under the 1949 Treaty of Washington, NATO operates by consensus, and the members are unlikely to give up the right to block a decision that runs counter to their perceived national interests. At least in theory, the more members NATO has, the more potential consensus-blockers there will be. This raises the theoretical prospect of deadlock on the use of the
alliance to deal with controversial security challenges, such as those that
will arise in the struggle against terrorism and in the Middle East. On the
other hand, it can be argued (and even demonstrated by recent events) that
the new members are no more likely, and perhaps even less likely, to prevent
an alliance consensus than are current members. The EU for years has struggled with the conflict between the need for effective decisionmaking and the desire of member states to protect their interests on important issues. Now it will have to deal with the degree to which such a large and diverse
infusion of new members will make this dilemma even more difficult. One of the critical issues before the EU's ongoing constitutional
convention is how to ensure that the Union, or whatever the convention may
decide to call the future organization, will be able to take necessary
decisions with a membership of 25 in 2004, and possibly more down the road. Meanwhile, there is some good news for those who remain hopeful about the
future of U.S.-EU relations. The arrangements negotiated in 2000 under which
the EU's European Security and Defense Policy would rely to some extent on
NATO planning and some critical military assets were finally put in place.
The accord means that the EU's military capabilities will develop in close
cooperation with NATO, and therefore with the United States. The future is for the United States and Europe to choose What kind of a future does all of this portend for US-European relations?
It could be drift and divorce, or simply prolonged deterioration. However, I
am inclined to argue that a more positive path is available, although not
guaranteed. Both the United States and the members of the European Union will have to
make decisions compatible with strengthening transatlantic ties. That is the
challenge to current and future policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States faces the challenge of using its power in ways that
reflect U.S. values and draw on the American public's desire to cooperate
with other countries while not inspiring opposition by being too domineering.
In other words, the United States has to be a hegemon without acting like
one. If U.S. allies still believe that U.S. leadership is essential on many international
issues, as they apparently do, then their challenge is to express their
criticism of U.S. leadership style in terms that are appropriate for frank
and honest discussions among friends, and in ways that will promote
US-European cooperation, not make it more difficult. At the end of the day, neither the United States nor the European allies
are likely to allow the current crisis in relations to undermine the broad
area of values and interests that they share. This is so in part because the
members of the European Union, individually and collectively, are the main
source of potential support and relief for the United States in maintaining
international stability. Take a quick look around the world and try to find other allies that are
as willing and able to make a wide range of military and non-military
contributions to international security. You won't find many beyond Europe. And, if Europeans look for allies that broadly share European values and
interests, most will conclude that the United States, with all its flaws,
will remain the most important and reliable world partner for a more united
Europe. The bottom line is that the United States and the members of the European
Union still need each other. Moreover, the international community needs this
"crucial couple" to find some form of marital harmony. Working
together, the United States and Europe have the wits and resources to deal
with most international problems, as demonstrated by British-French-U.S. collaboration
late in 2002 to produce a UN Security Council resolution on Iraq. In the
absence of such cooperation - as recently demonstrated over Iraq - the
international community simply doesn't function very well. But the United States and the members of the European Union must breathe
new life into the sense of common destiny among the Atlantic community of
nations. For those who share this belief, the time has come to start preparing a
re-awakening of transatlantic good will and cooperation. The Atlantic Community has been the first victim of the crisis over Iraq. No matter how the Iraq issue is resolved, we should now begin preparation
of a new Atlantic Community Treaty. The treaty would have both political and
functional goals. Politically, such a major political act would shift the focus of
US-European relations toward all that we have in common and away from the
exclusive focus on what divides us. Functionally, the treaty among all members of NATO and the European Union
would create a soft-power framework of cooperation to complement the hard
power frameworks of NATO and the EU's Common European Security and Defense
Policy. This will not be easy; attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic today make
it even more difficult. However, without a renewed sense of common destiny, the United States
would be weaker and less predictable and Europe would be less confident and
much less secure. |
|
|