The Emergence of the CESDP and the state of the transatlantic relations: the perspective of Central European candidate states for EU membership⁽¹⁾

Vladimir Bilcik, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

(Published as an occasional paper by the Austrian Institute for European Security Policy,

January 2002. Reproduced here with the permission of the author.)

Introduction

This paper aims to assess the latest developments in the transatlantic relations and in the EU security and defense policies from the perspective of the candidate states for EU membership. The marked developments of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) over the course of the past three years have added a new dimension to the transatlantic relations in the area of security policy. At a time when the European Union is completing its challenging task of enlarging to the east, the EU is also committing itself to playing a more visible and a more coherent international role. Therefore, whilst the CESDP remains largely outside of the Treaties' framework, the goals of these policies, their guiding institutional structures and potential political, strategic and economic implications beg a whole set of questions about the impact of the current round of EU enlargement. By assessing the statements and the concerns of Central European post-communist candidate states for EU membership this paper argues that enlargement is bound to bring not just a host of opportunities but also possible problems with respect to future effectiveness and cohesion of the CESDP. Drawing on the attitudes of candidate states toward the transatlantic relations and the EU's evolving security and defense arm the paper points to the positive potential of enlargement, particularly with respect to the endurance of a strong transatlantic link and to future formation of the Union's eastern policy. At the same time, there are a number of uncertainties, concerns and even confusions over the course of the transatlantic relations and the CESDP's developments. While it is true that the accession into the Union will allow for full participation of new member states in these developments, their present level of involvement and the Union's lacking clarity about the CESDP's direction in its relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seem insufficient preconditions for the success of this policy area in the future.

The paper begins with a brief background on foreign and security policy of the candidate states. It sketches the path of the Visegrad countries into NATO. It then looks at the views of the candidate states toward the evolution of the CFSP and the CESDP, draws on their attitudes toward the transatlantic link and especially examines the concerns over EU-NATO relations. Finally, it suggests possible improvements in the participation of applicants in the development of the CESDP prior to enlargement and discusses the potential contribution of Central European states toward formulating active policy initiatives in relation to the future neighbors of the EU. After all, the way the CESDP and the transatlantic relations more broadly are handled during this round of enlargement will affect not only the functioning of a wider EU and an enlarged NATO but also have consequences for any other rounds of enlargement. The paper attempts to address broad questions, it draws on select examples from the Visegrad states and does not have the ambition to capture fully the diversity of ideas and relevant issues with respect to all candidate states for EU membership.

As the paper illustrates, the post-communist candidate states have a short tradition of independent foreign policymaking. The low level of institutionalization in foreign and security policymaking of the post-communist states has to do largely with the unique circumstances of post-1989 developments. Since the break-up of the bipolar world Central and Eastern Europe experienced the establishment of several new and young states. Six current accession countries are less than eleven years old. All have had to cope with the challenge of newly found sovereignty in a redefined political environment. Consequently, foreign and security policy, as a fairly recent phenomenon, has been significantly shaped by the domestic goals of post-communist transition and by Europe's post-Cold War international context that brought up among other priorities the respective enlargements of both NATO and the EU.

The Visegrad countries on the way to NATO

After the break-up of the bipolar world, three Central European countries - Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland - emerged as the three most natural candidates for closer integration with the existing western political, security and economic institutional structures. Together with the former German Democratic Republic these states comprised the most economically developed region of the former communist block with strong historical ties to their respective immediate western neighbors - Germany and Austria - and the west more broadly. The three countries, "kidnapped"⁽²⁾ by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, gradually re-gained their sovereignty following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the departure of the Soviet armies from the region. In the changing international context of the early 1990s Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary sought their new place in a formerly divided continent. The three countries gradually developed closer ties among themselves in the form of the so-called Visegrad cooperation.⁽³⁾ Externally they established strong connections both to NATO and to the EU. These two international groupings in turn became the dominant factors in the shaping of their respective foreign, security and economic policies.

Following the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia on 1 January 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged as the two new successor states. Since its independence Slovakia's political developments followed a somewhat divergent path from its three Visegrad neighbors. Slovakia's case of regime change has been described as "a borderline case between that of more advanced Central European and lagging South-East European countries".⁽⁴⁾ The difference in the political trajectory of Slovakia and that of its post-communist Central European neighbors has manifested itself in the area of foreign policy, particularly in the country's relations to both NATO and the EU. At the same time, the respective Polish, Czech and Hungarian paths toward memberships in these western security and political structures were by no means identical.

Although on the face of the facts today the orientation of the post-communist Central Europe toward NATO and the EU seems self-evident, the road to the present position of the Visegrad countries vis-a-vis these organizations proved less uniform and even complicated at times. Whilst in the 1980s Hungary and Poland experienced both certain moves toward some formal ties with the west and the presence of a visible domestic opposition to the communist political regime, Czechoslovakia was by late 1980s still an example of one of the most hard-line communist regimes that had risen to power after the suppression of the Prague spring reform movement in 1968. Thus, Hungary joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982. And in 1988 the country established full diplomatic relations with the European Communities.⁽⁵⁾ Conversely, a strong internal anti-communist movement in the form of Solidarnosc peaked in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s. After its supression and a period of martial law in Poland (1981-1983), in 1989 the government and the opposition agreed on "semi-free" elections. As a result Poland became the first Soviet-block country led by non-communist Prime Minister - Tadeusz Mazowiecki.⁽⁶⁾ In contrast to the gradual changes in Poland and in Hungary, the Czechoslovak transition to post-communism proved a lot more sudden. Initiated by the student protests in November 1989 and complemented by vast nation-wide demonstrations, the anti-regime movement, however, quickly gained momentum and by December 1989 a number of former dissidents together with the communists formed a new government. Furthermore Vaclav Havel, a dissident playwright, replaced Gustav Husak as the new Czechoslovak President.

Domestic changes in the three countries together with the shifting international context had marked implications on the new foreign and especially security policy of Central European states. Yet, the orientation toward NATO did not become immediately apparent following the dissolution of the Soviet block. Particularly Czechoslovakia went through a brief period of "idealistic foreign policy"⁽⁷⁾, characterized by a preference for the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO and by a support for the activities of pan-European security structures, especially the CSCE (predecessor of the OSCE). The Czechoslovak policy changed fairly quickly with the failure of the CSCE at the outbreak of civil war in the former Yugoslavia. More broadly, this idealism evaporated fast with the Soviet intervention in Lithuania. Gradual preference for NATO as "the only functioning security institution"⁽⁸⁾ was reinforced by the perception of the U.S. strength and ultimate its decisiveness during the Gulf war.

In contrast with the initial phase of Czechoslovakia's official 'idealistic foreign policy' Hungarian Prime Minister Guyla Horn pondered the possibility of NATO mebership as early as in February 1990. During a debate at the Hungarian Society of Political Sciences he said: "I think that the proposal of many years for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is an illusion at present...the Warsaw Pact has to be transformed into a body of consultation and co-ordination...tight relations have to be created with the North Atlantic Alliance; in fact I do not consider it impossible that Hungary shall become a member of the various political organs of NATO."⁽⁹⁾ Horn's statement certainly stirred up some controversy and other voices inside Hungary suggested that "a small nation can only flourish if it is neutral".⁽¹⁰⁾ Likewise, the Polish goal to join the North Atlantic Alliance was not completely smooth. Marked by turbulent and often tragic history in relations both to Russia and to Germany, Poland probably seemed the most obvious candidate for voicing a clear preference for close ties with NATO. Yet, even the debate in Poland between 1990 and 1991 was hardly straighforward. The move toward NATO and beyond the notions of neutrality or other potential regional or pan-European structures demanded strong leadership from the country's political elites.⁽¹¹⁾ The country's membership in NATO was mentioned as an explicit strategic goal of Polish foreign policy in 1992.⁽¹²⁾ Indeed, by this time the regional and wider international setting changed in some fundamental ways: the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991, the same year witnessed the departure of last Soviet troops from the region and in the fall of 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

et, NATO enlargement was by no means on the agenda of the Alliance. The debate was initiated in the U.S. thanks to the article published in Foreign Affairs by the RAND troika in October 1993.⁽¹³⁾ According to the authors, Europe's post-cold war challenges lay almost exclusively along two "arcs of crisis". Nationalism and ethnic conflicts posed the greatest threat to Central Europe's fledgling democracies and NATO, led by and fully engaged United States, provided the most appropriate mechanism for addressing security threats in these regions.⁽¹⁴⁾ In their seven-set program to develop a new "U.S.-European bargain" they proposed - as one point - integration of the Visegrad countries into the EU and NATO - a move that would "strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal [NATO] support for U.S. views on key security issues."⁽¹⁵⁾

Next to the American initiatives to expand the Alliance, German support was crucial to the momentum of NATO enlargement. In 1993 German Defense Minister Volker Rühe stated that "[w]ithout our neighbors in central and eastern Europe, the strategic unity of Europe would remain a torso and an illusion."⁽¹⁶⁾ The breaking point in favor of enlargement in the whole Alliance came at the NATO summit in Brussels when the sixteen Allied leaders reaffirmed that NATO was open to membership of other European states. In particular, NATO would welcome if enlargement reached to democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe. In September 1995 the Alliance came up with its Study on NATO Enlargement that - among other factors - specified the criteria for inviting new future members. During 1996 the Alliance undertook an intensive dialogue with 12 interested Partner countries that included the four Visegrad states. The decision to enlarge was taken at the Madrid summit in on 8 July 1997 when NATO invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to begin accession talks about their eventual membership. Other countries were left out - including Slovakia⁽¹⁷⁾ - but the Alliance remained open to future enlargements. Following the accession talks with the three countries, the ratification of Protocols of Accession and the domestic legislative procedures in the candidate states, NATO officially enlarged to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary on 12 March 1999.

Today NATO maintains open its open door policy and it is widely expected that the Alliance is going to enlarge further at the next summit scheduled to be held in Prague in the fall of 2002. Following the political changes in Slovakia after the parliamentary elections in 1998 and the end of a period of relative international isolation under the government led by the Prime Minister Vladimír Meiar between 1994-1998, Slovakia has become one of the primary candidates for the next wave of NATO enlargement. Despite the proclaimed consensus of Slovak political elites to join the Alliance, Slovakia's admission into NATO hinges to a significant extent on the outcome of the next parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002 and the political make-up of the next coalition government. Notwithstanding the existing contingencies in Slovakia's path to NATO, the country - like its Visegrad neighbors - has in recent years with concrete deeds consistently endorsed its explicit wish to become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.⁽¹⁸⁾

The Visegrad countries and the EU's Common Foreign and security policy (CFSP)

In the early 1990s the European Communities - though not an organization of collective defense or security - represented another institutional framework that became instrumental in the direction of Central Europe's post-communist transition. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia managed to establish formal ties with the European Communities (EC) rather quickly. Yet, the ultimate goal of full membership in this grouping began to materialize only at a slow rate. The three countries signed their respective bilateral "Europe Agreements" in December 1991. Whilst the signing of these documents signaled potentially closer ties between the post-communist Central Europe and the EC, the "Europe Agreements" fell short of expectations. They offered neither the prospects of full membership for the countries of the ex-Soviet block nor did they provide for liberalization of EC agricultural, steel and textile markets in which the Visegrad group possessed a notable comparative trading advantage. The initial institutionalization of relations between the Visegrad group and the EC became somewhat emblematic of subsequent interactions between the European Union and the four Central European countries. In comparative terms, enlarging NATO has proved a less complex task than enlarging the EU.

The EU strategy toward eastern enlargement has been characterized by much uncertainty and only incremental steps forward. While the time until 1993 has been described as a period of "introspective rhetoric" for the EU, still searching for most adequate answers to the collapse of the Berlin wall, the era since 1993 has been coined as one of "ambiguous activism".⁽¹⁹⁾ Following the bilateral 'Europe Agreements' signed between the European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in December 1991 the Copenhagen summit in June 1993 opened the possibility of eastern enlargement by setting the criteria for the candidate countries. Next followed the agreement at the Essen European Council meeting in December 1994 that negotiations for the accession of the new member states could not begin until after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference reviewing the workings of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) had been completed. The Madrid summit in December 1995 confirmed that enlargement negotiations would begin six months following the completion of the 1996 IGC which concluded in June 1997. The Luxembourg summit in December of the same year invited the first group of six countries (the so-called 5+1 group) to start negotiations while five other countries were offered the possibility of a screening of the acquis.⁽²⁰⁾ Yet, the conclusions of the Luxembourg summit did not preclude the possibility that countries of the second group could in fact overtake states invited to the negotiating table in the first group. The EU has maintained its position of negotiating entry on an individual rather than a bloc basis. At the summit in Helsinki in December 1999 the European Union invited the additional five countries of the second group plus Malta to the negotiating table. Since February 2000 the European Union has been negotiating with twelve countries, most of which stand a realistic chance of joining the Union in the foreseeable future.

In preparation for EU membership the Common Foreign and Security Policy that originated with the Treaty of Maastricht has been playing a certain role in shaping the boundaries and the focus of the candidate states' foreign and security policies. The candidate countries - in their status of associated countries - have been taking an active part in the forms of cooperation within the CFSP framework. They have been rather consistently aligning themselves with the declarations, demarches, common positions and joint actions of the EU.⁽²¹⁾ In certain cases - such as during the Kosovo conflict - the candidate states have imposed sanctions adopted by the Union vis--vis third countries. Cooperation and coordination of positions - whenever possible - takes place at international forums and inside international organizations, such as the United Nations. The framework of CFSP has fostered the resolution of any territorial disputes between the candidate countries and EU member states and has encouraged good neighborly relations, for instance between Slovakia and Hungary. It has also emphasized participation in and compliance with regimes of non-proliferation of weapons and export controls.

Formally, the domain of the CFSP has not posed problems for Central and Eastern European countries. Partly, an explanation lies in the existing limits to the effectiveness and to the coherence of the CFSP. Changes to the CFSP have been rather marginal since the agreement struck in Maastricht and it remains a principally intergovernmental policy area. Moreover, the CFSP suffered heavily in the face of the EU's failure to act and intervene successfully in the crises of ex-Yugoslavia. Compliance with the CFSP provisions requires no extra financial or institutional resources. The character of cooperation in this area does not necessitate major changes to domestic legislation. While the area of CFSP is potentially sensitive with possible future implications on national sovereignty, this has not been an issue thus far. It therefore does not seem all that surprising the chapter on "Common Foreign and Security Policy" has been among the easier parts of the accession process. All candidate states have been able to close it provisionally and all are expected that upon the date of accession they will be ready to participate fully in the formulation, adoption and implementation of all CFSP instruments available under the EU Treaty.

Enlargement raises the natural question of how the CFSP may be affected upon the full inclusion of as many as twelve new member states in the EU. While in the past enlargements seemed to have had little to no impact on the CFSP or earlier the European Political Cooperation (EPC)⁽²²⁾, the current wave may be different. The size and the geopolitical reality of the EU will change more fundamentally than during any previous rounds of enlargement. The boundaries of a wider EU will reach some potentially unstable borders and regions with more strategic significance for Europe as a whole. Although the peer pressure toward reaching unanimity remains high inside the Council, effective decision-making and common action may be increasingly difficult to achieve without communitarizing CFSP further. More importantly, advancements in the area of CFSP have largely taken place thanks to the pressure of external crises. Recent developments in Europe, and specifically in Kosovo, have prompted the evolution of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). Future cooperation and action in the area of defense may not be possible without more formidable, efficient and strategically formulated CFSP. The goals of the CESDP are already reshaping the role of the European Union. These may give new meaning and impetus to the Europe's foreign policymaking.

The transatlantic relations in the context of the emerging CESDP: the candidate states' perspective

Although the CESDP is a rather new policy area and remains almost exclusively outside of the framework of the EU Treaties⁽²³⁾, it has brought new dynamics into the building of the EU's security role. By raising the issue of the EU's military capabilities, its capacities for action in the area security and defense and its relationship to NATO, the CESDP has introduced a number of important factors in relation to the current round of EU enlargement. Since the announcement at the Franco-British summit at St Malo in December 1998 in favor of the development of a European "capacity for autonomous military action, backed by credible military forces", the development toward an operational CESDP took off at a relatively quick pace. The Cologne summit in June 1999 established the basic institutional structures for the emerging EU security and defense policy. The Helsinki summit came up with the so-called 'Headline Goal' of desired force levels for a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), capable of deploying in crisis management operations - including peace-making - after 2003. The Helsinki summit also invited third countries (these include candidate states for EU membership and all non-EU NATO member states) to contribute to the improvement of European military capacities. The Feira and Nice summits in 2000 made further progress toward the CESDP. The former created a structure for dialogue with 15 countries outside of the EU that are either candidates for membership (13 states) and/or non-EU NATO members (6 states). The latter modified the Treaty of the European Union and thus created basic preconditions for the CESDP's development inside the EU Treaties' framework.

The CESDP's progress has been remarkable especially in the area of new security, defense and military commitments made by the EU and in the developments of institutional structures that are to underpin the functioning of this policy. Whilst successful institutionalization of the CESDP seems necessary for its further practical implementation, further headway will be determined by acquiring real capabilities, by addressing the issues of planning and relations to NATO and by delimiting the CESDP's strategic and operational objectives. Today the CESDP begs many questions and provides few answers. This situation naturally raises a whole set of views and concerns on the side of the candidate states.

The CESDP added a whole new dimension to issues of the second pillar. Whereas the CFSP has so far been largely an exercise in political and bureaucratic integration, the development of CESDP encompasses a bigger range of functional tasks. In short, the CESDP is no longer just about EU business of political, economic and legislative integration. It touches on and in some ways competes with other security and defense initiatives and priorities that have shaped the foreign policy goals of post-communist countries throughout the 1990s. In particular, these include the desire to join NATO that has primarily been motivated by the guarantees of collective defense - an area not covered by the CESDP. To the extent that it exists, the debate in the candidate states about the CESDP has in part reflected general uncertainties over its future development inside the EU. It has most visibly focused on the relations between NATO and the EU and it has also addressed the question of participation by current accession states in the present and future developments of the CESDP.

Political versus operational support

Statements about CESDP by candidate states have tended to be rather reserved and general. The Polish Position to the latest IGC came up with a statement mirroring some of the confusion on the side of both the European Union and the candidate states. The Polish government wrote: "As the EU Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) is at initial stage of its evolution, it is extremely difficult to assess the significance of the Intergovernmental Conference's potential decisions. That there is no agreement among the EU members themselves as to the final shape in which to build the CESDP makes the problem even more complex."⁽²⁴⁾ Official negotiating positions on Common Foreign and Security Policy have been vague. Post-communist countries that began negotiations following the Luxembourg summit provisionally closed the CFSP chapter even before the CESDP became an issue. Slovakia has been "monitoring the developments related to the European Security and Defence Policy in connection with the building of autonomous decision-making capacities and, where NATO as a whole will not be engaged, supports possible EU-led peace-keeping operations."⁽²⁵⁾

While the CESDP has received political backing, in a number of candidate countries it seems to lack a clear operational structure that could both foster more clarity in understanding the policy process and its problems and help draft a more constructive contribution to the current debate. Instead there remains much confusion. Slovakia, a country that has caught up in accession negotiations with the Luxembourg group of states, provides an exemplary illustration. As much as the debate on the CESDP has been vague and has received a general welcome by the governing political parties, it was the Slovak National Party, right-wing nationalists, which openly endorsed the idea of autonomous European defense capabilities. Their motivation was simple: it was not NATO and it did not involve Americans.

Yet, the nationalists' simplified attitude is somewhat emblematic of the official policy that is marked by a strong lack of clarity. At the policymaking level the CESDP is still perceived exclusively as a part of the EU agenda and is not necessarily viewed as a part of wider security and defense policy agenda. At the basic institutional level the position of European correspondent handles the CESDP matters virtually alone. The policy is limited to the established institutional structures in the context of the CFSP and the primary concern rests with the existing modes of dialogue with the EU. A broader strategic view, including wider security matters and issues of planning and coordination, is lacking. Although the EU itself remains unclear about many issues related to the CESDP, current Slovak arrangements contrast sharply with institutional and policymaking setups in EU member states - including France - where the CESDP is handled more comprehensively, as a part of larger security arrangements.

The CESDP and the transatlantic link

Apart from weak institutional structures, most candidate states perceive that the CESDP brings up a potential clash with one of their primary security policy priorities, namely, membership in NATO. In a recent TV interview Vaclav Klaus, Chairman of the lower house of the Czech Parliament and the Civic Democratic Party, said: "European defense is driving a wedge between NATO and the EU".⁽²⁶⁾ Klaus's view is somewhat extreme. Yet, although the candidate countries generally recognize European integration as a political project and therefore the building of the CESDP is both necessary and inevitable, there is a definite concern about the maintenance of a strong and clearly defined EU-US connection. In a recent speech Viktor Orbán, Hungary's Prime Minister, emphasized that "A new EU-US relationship is key: the transatlantic link is at the core of a balanced Europe."⁽²⁷⁾ During a visit to Moscow Wladyslaw Bartoszewski diplomatically summed up the Polish position - calling it "clear and consistent." He went on, "As a European country we recognize the need for development of the European defense and political identity; as a NATO state with a burden of a certain historic experience, we shall strive for preservation of the Alliance's full potential."⁽²⁸⁾ Similarly, in its official statement Slovakia understands the formation of security and defense policy of the European Union as "a complementary process to the system of collective defense of the North Atlantic Alliance."⁽²⁹⁾

With varying degrees of domestic elite and public consensus NATO membership has been the key security policy priority in practically all Central and Eastern European post-communist states. Three Visegrad countries became members of the Alliance in 1999, nine other states⁽³⁰⁾ are hoping for an invitation to join at the Prague summit scheduled for November 2002. Given the date, for most candidate states membership in the Alliance represents a more pressing priority than membership in the EU. While most EU member states - also members of NATO - are principally concerned with the CESDP and crisis management operations, most EU candidate states are focusing much of their current energies on gaining admission into an alliance of collective defense. In addition to this issue of diverging goals, the preoccupation with the maintenance of the transatlantic link, stems partly from the historical experience and from the threat perception of Central and Eastern Europeans. As some of the previous quotes demonstrate, these countries, including new NATO members, still feel more exposed to dangers of instability than perhaps much of Western Europe does. Also, past reliance solely on West European powers - particularly prior to, during and shortly after the WWII - did not work to the benefit of Central and Eastern Europe. From the standpoint of this region, continued involvement of the United States in Europe's security structures and guarantees is crucial. Moreover, applicant states for EU membership have invested heavily both in gaining and in maintaining NATO membership. Hence, the endurance of the transatlantic connection is vital.

Modes of participation

The last point finds support in the differing experience with the existing modes of participation inside structures of cooperation created by NATO and by the nascent CESDP.

The Feira summit held between 19-20 June 2000 identified principles and modalities for arrangements to allow for non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession candidates to contribute to EU military management. At the same time it invited contributions from all partner third states to the improvement of European capabilities. Proposed arrangements for dialogue suggest "full respect for decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework". Simultaneously, they aim to create "a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU."⁽³¹⁾ The proposed structures have created a framework for dialogue under the so-called 15 plus 15 formula (15 EU members states plus 15 countries non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession states) and under a formula 15 plus 6 whereby the latter include all non-EU NATO member states. The Feira conclusions indicate that a minimum of two meetings of per Presidency will take place both in EU+15 format and in EU+6 format.

Although the candidate states are going to become full-fledged actors in the institutional structures and the decision-making of the CESDP upon EU enlargement, present modalities of participation in the building of the CESDP do not seem adequately sufficient. The current structures imply both a certain degree of exclusion and a certain lack of decision-shaping contribution on the side of the applicants. While it is foremost necessary for the CESDP to establish its decision-making and its institutional identity inside the EU, it is equally important to offer a greater degree of inclusion to those countries that are soon to enter the Union. A recent set of Polish "proposals for practical development of Feira decisions concerning the EU cooperation with non-EU European Allies"⁽³²⁾ stressed - with the reference to the inclusion of the six non-EU NATO member states - the importance of two factors. One, it focused on the inclusion in the decision-shaping process and two, as a practical example it emphasized the WEU culture of work with broad involvement of non-members in its policies.

Indeed the comparison could be extended to the involvement of other EU candidate states and broadened to the example of their participation inside structures created by NATO. The three Visegrad NATO members are already fully engaged in NATO defense planning process. All other post-communist accession countries are included in NATO's planning and review process (PARP) that operates under the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). At the same time, the most recent ex-communist NATO member states are also Associate Members of the WEU, while the other seven Central and Eastern European candidate countries are WEU Associate Partners. One of the derived privileges is that Associate Partners participate in the decision-shaping process by being able to propose concrete policy initiatives. With the transfer of most WEU functions to the EU, involvement of EU candidate states in the CESDP's decision-shaping process does not seem comparable.

The non-NATO candidate states also participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which represents a more advanced version of the PfP in their respective bids for full NATO membership and entails a good degree of joint defense planning with the Alliance.⁽³³⁾ Contrary to the CESDP, NATO offers both operational and political backing. One of the driving ideas behind the "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) program has been the inclusion of others. Through the PfP a number of states have become partial decision-shapers of NATO. While at present EU member states "invite" and "welcome" additional contribution of forces by candidate states, the PfP program explicitly calls for contribution of forces. Arguably, NATO has been keener on involving outsiders. The Alliance's political and military framework for participation - created in the context of the PfP - includes more than forty countries. As the example of the Kosovo crisis demonstrates, a common framework of inclusion for both members and non-members of NATO has been an important factor in preventing any spill-over of violence into a wider neighborhood of states. As a follow-up, NATO's planning and review process (PARP) and permanent operational structures created in the context of the PfP help ensure smooth participation of forces from PfP countries in K-FOR operation.

Although participation of candidate states in either NATO or WEU structures never implied involvement in the decision-making process of these organizations, it has certainly allowed a comparatively greater involvement in the preparations of decisions. The current mode of political participation in the CESDP with regular ministerial meetings of EU member states and EU candidate states is somewhat reminiscent of the Union's Structured Dialogue initiated by the German Presidency of the EU in 1994. The Structured Dialogue was a multilateral framework of regular interactions between the EU and the associated Central and Eastern European countries that preceded the opening of direct accession talks after the Luxembourg summit of the EU.⁽³⁴⁾ Devised and implemented at the start of the enlargement process, the Structured Dialogue soon proved both ineffective and insufficient in providing space for voices from the applicant states and in addressing their respective concerns. The existing arrangements of association in the CESDP resemble frameworks that have been long outlived.

Whilst the CESDP is a new and very much an evolving policy area, it should be in the EU's interest to include the soon-to-be member states under a more encompassing umbrella of partnership. Their current inclusion may not only affect their behavior after EU accession. It also sets a specific precedence for dealing with future potential candidate states for EU membership. Furthermore, positive experience with NATO operational structures does appear to suggest that from the standpoint of the EU accession states, the CESDP should have a definite Euro-Atlantic dimension. One of the basic preconditions for successful inclusion of future EU member states rests with NATO's involvement and a clear agreement between the EU and NATO on issues of strategy, capabilities, access to assets and permanent structures of consultation.

EU Enlargement and the future of the CFSP and the CESDP

Concerns over the current involvement of the candidate states for EU membership raises questions over their future active participation in and contribution to the policy areas of the CFSP and the CESDP. The geographic and the geopolitical dimensions of the next round of EU enlargement indicate a variety of potential strategies and practical additions in the realm of the CFSP and the CESDP. Approaches toward the eastern and the southern neighborhood of a wider EU will have to consider different nature of new political, economic, legal and security divisions. Among other factors they will have to take into account the size and the relative weight of each neighboring state. In certain cases, they will be building upon the existing strategies, in others they will be forced to start from scratch. The breadth of the focus of the CFSP and the CESDP will undoubtedly grow. However, current accession states are most likely to pay attention to and to come up with concrete proposals in future EU relations to Russia, Ukraine and southeastern Europe.

Compared to the challenges to foreign policy of the EU caused by a potential accession of Turkey, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe represents only a relative change to the nature of the CFSP. The Union seems many years away from having to deal with direct borders to Iran or Iraq whereas Russia is its neighbor already. Nonetheless, the completion of the current round of enlargement is going to give the whole Continent a much clearer dividing line between Russia and the rest of Europe. Also, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are going to be separated from the Union by a much more distinct and less porous frontier. Whilst the Union has been rather open to offers of possible membership to the unstable successor states of the former Yugoslavia, such as Macedonia, or its immediate neighbor Albania, the 'European' prospects for future eastern neighbors of a wider EU seem less clear.⁽³⁵⁾

Both Russia and Ukraine - the largest and strategically most significant countries in the EU's eastern neighborhood are in no position to ponder accession any time soon. In June and in December 1999 respectively the EU adopted its "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia" and "Common Strategy of the European Union on Ukraine".⁽³⁶⁾ Generally defined strategic goals include support for democracy, market economy and European stability and security in relation to Russia and support for post-communist transition and closer cooperation in the context of enlargement in relation to Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia's special position is highlighted by regular EU-Russia summits held at the highest political level.

Contribution to the CFSP

For the past ten years foreign policy priorities of the candidate states have principally included the goals of NATO and EU memberships and development of various forms of regional cooperation, such as the Visegrad group. Clear and comprehensive policy toward the east has been largely lacking - except for the general aim of distinguishing oneself from the east, of not being part of it any longer. Most intellectual, political, economic and financial resources have been consumed on the path to key western institutions and structures. Whilst the priority of European and transatlantic integration is going to remain central for some time to come, accession inside the EU system of common rules and norms can arguably place some candidate states in a strong position to gradually shift focus on relations with their eastern neighbors.

The EU policy toward its two future biggest neighbors will always be shaped by a larger context of transatlantic relations.⁽³⁷⁾ Although this broader picture is certainly going to condition the specific contribution of the candidate states to the formation of the Union's policy toward Russia and Ukraine, these countries can bring new value to future specific policies and eastern initiatives. Their respective comparative advantage stems from common historical ties, geographic and linguistic proximity as well as shared experience of post-communist transition. Upon enlargement accession countries will be most immediately confronted by a double challenge, namely how to combine some effective eastern strategy with commitments to EU trading rules, visa regimes and border controls.

Initiatives by future member states will have to strike balance between specific policy initiatives and a broader agreement inside the Union. Such common understanding may be hard to reach even among the candidate states as the example of the Visegrad group's relations with Ukraine illustrates. Although during the summit of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad countries in the High Tatras between 16-17 October 1999 the participants agreed to coordinate the course of action in meeting EU requirements in connection with the implementation of the Schengen Treaty, the Visegrad countries proved unable to coordinate their action. During February and March 2000 the Czech Republic and Slovakia respectively decided to introduce visas for Ukrainians starting from 28 June 2000. Yet, Poland and Hungary remain committed to implementing their visa regimes in relation to Ukraine at the latest possible date. This specific event demonstrates both differences in the perception of national interests of the Visegrad states in the post-Soviet state and lacking concepts of some regional responsibility among the Visegrad Four.⁽³⁸⁾ More broadly, it suggests that whilst the post-communist countries have a comparative advantage in knowledge and experience with the current and future eastern and southern neighbors of the EU, the task of following common approaches is and will be more complicated. Such experience may foster more flexible positions to the field of the CFSP, though currently there do not seem any specific proposals from the side of the candidate states.

Less politically visible and more incremental tools of foreign and security policy can play a useful role. These include practical initiatives at a more local level. Today there exists a number of Euroregions that cut across the future dividing lines of the EU insiders and EU outsiders. The Carpathian Euroregion is a good example. It covers a vast area that cuts across five countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine and Romania) and includes a plethora of ethnic and religious groups totaling around 10 million people on a territory with distinctly varying economic standards. Initiatives inside the developing structures of Euroregions could create pressure for concrete policies at the national and EU the level. Local solutions may prove most applicable not only in the case of the Carpathian Euroregion but also in other areas, such as Kaliningrad.

Apart from official structures there are other important agents of change, reform and good neighborly relations. Most notably, many post-communist candidate states have a relatively well-institutionalized non-governmental sector. During a recent visit by Ukrainian President Kuchma to Slovakia, Slovak Prime Minister Dzurinda called upon Slovak NGOs that aim to support structures of democracy and market economy in Ukraine.⁽³⁹⁾ Civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and regionally based NGOs have been equally active in the institutional rebuilding of war-ridden successor states of ex-Yugoslav socialist federation. More recently, through educational activities and the sharing of experience and know-how they have helped to facilitate last year's democratic change in Serbia. Similar efforts could be replicated not only in Ukraine but also in Belarus, Moldova and parts of Russia.

Contribution to the CESDP

The domestic stability of the Central European candidate states alone adds to the stability of a wider EU neighborhood and represents the contribution of these countries toward the success of the CESDP. More practically, the Capabilities Commitment Conference held in November 2000 saw pledges from EU candidate states to the EU military force. The latest informal EU defence ministerial meeting 15 + 15 emphasized "the importance of the partner countries role in the next Capabilities Commitment Conference…, partner countries contributions are considered in a very positive way by the members of the Union". Although the pledges exist on paper, in reality it is questionable whether the candidate states could sustain and finance the contributions they have pledged. Realistically, the numbers are likely to be smaller. The accession countries have already allocated some forces that are serving within the framework of S-FOR and K-FOR in Bosnia and Kosovo respectively. Additional available inter-operable forces are likely to be limited and expensive to support over a longer period of time. However, while expectations of defense and military contributions should be modest, their peace-keeping experience during the past ten years places the candidate states in a solid position of reliable participants in future crisis management operations.

In the institutional and practical context of decision-making and decision-shaping EU enlargement is likely to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic dimension of the CESDP. The Polish position to the 2000 IGC states that the involvement in a potential EU crisis management operation will depend on particular States' case-to-case and that "there are no advocates at present among the States of the Fifteen of giving the Communities any competence in the second EU pillar." At the same time, according to the Polish opinion: "EU civilian crisis management may be one area where competencies could be transferred to the Communities as the resources necessary to implement them are to be found mainly within the EU first pillar."

With the growing inclusion of broader policy tools (such as internal policing or policing of borders) in connection with the CESDP, pressure toward some communitarization of security and defense could increase. After all, several candidate states favor already today moves toward the harmonization of asylum policy and toward more open police cooperation. The issues of control, oversight and publicly available information are other areas where some candidate states could draw on their experience with participation in the WEU Parliamentary Assembly. The area of civilian crisis management may nurture thoughts on greater involvement of the European Parliament in the formation of the CESDP. Although the questions of accountability and legitimacy with respect to foreign, security and defense policy will become increasingly essential anyway, enlargement can offer an added chance for addressing them.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to sketch out the principal attitudes toward and concerns about the transatlantic political and security link as perceived by the post-communist Central European states. The paper illustrates the overall commitment of the Visegrad states toward membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Since the early 1990s NATO has played a very formative role in foreign and security policies of the Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Today three of the Visegrad states are full-fledged members of the Alliance and Slovakia ranks highly among the candidate states that are expected to receive an invitation to join at the Prague summit in the fall of 2002.

The recent developments in the area of the Common European Security and Defense Policy have added a new dimension and a separate set of questions to the future course of transatlantic relations. From the perspective of the candidate states the evolution of the CESDP cannot be perceived in isolation from their broader foreign and security policy goals. Nor can they be separated from the developments inside the accession states and from internal policy concerns of the Union as a whole. While enlargement of the European Union has a definite potential to add to the dynamism to the CESDP, it also brings with it a number of unanswered questions. If these are not handled properly and timely, they could pose problems for the future functioning of common foreign, security and defense policies in a bigger European Union.

The Common European Security and Defense Policy is at the moment primarily consumed with resolving thorny issues halting its progress inside the EU. Yet, with prospects for enlargement to the first post-communist countries in 2004, the CESDP needs to take a more encompassing view of its activities and offer a more inclusive and intensive structure of involvement to the candidate states for EU membership. The attitudes of Central and Eastern European policymakers reflect both a degree of caution and some confusion about the CESDP and its direction. Partly, this has to do with a wider set of foreign policy goals, such as the current focus on NATO membership. It also mirrors the degree of exclusion in the debate over the future EU-NATO relations, most notably among the non-NATO applicant countries. The lacking clarity of direction combined with missing input and information on the CESDP and a low level of its domestic institutionalization do not constitute an adequate position of countries that enjoy a realistic chance of full-fledged EU membership in the foreseeable future.

Apart from the aforementioned concerns enlargement of the European Union in the context of its nascent security and defense identity offers a unique role for a more visible and a more meaningful EU role in international affairs. The candidate states will enter the Union offering a unique set of experience, know-how and flexibility gained in their respective paths of post-communist transition. Whilst their financial and military resources remain limited, the candidate states can bring in fresh ideas, regional initiatives and innovative modes of institutionalized interactions in relation to future eastern and southern neighbors of an enlarged European Union. Here, the accession process already offers potentially positive gains for the EU as a whole.

Notes

¹ I am grateful to several Slovak diplomats and policymakers for their comments and insights in preparation of this paper. This paper also draws in part on research carried out in the context of the work of a working group "Issues and Consequences of EU Enlargement" sponsored by the Bertelsmann Foundation.

² This expression is was used by Milan Kundera in his essay on Central Europe "The Tragedy of Central Europe" The New York Review of Books, April 26, pp. 33-38.

³ The Visegrad cooperation was intiated in February 1991 when Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed the Visegrad declaration pledging mutual support for the objective of integration into "the European political, economic, security and legislative order". Today the Visegrad group - the so-called V-4 - is composed of four members: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

⁴ Sona Szomolanyi, "Political Elites and Slovakia's Transition Path" Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 16.

⁵ Lajos Pietsch. Hungary and NATO, Budapest: Hungarian Atlantic Council, 1998, p.9.

⁶ Cornelius Ochmann, "Polen" in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.) Europa-Handbuch. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1999, pp. 221-232.

⁷ Josefine Wallat, "Tschechien und Slowakei" in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.) Europa-Handbuch. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1999, pp. 234-235.

⁸ Speech by the Czech President Vaclav Havel in NATO headquarters in Brussels on 21 March 1991.

⁹ Speech by Guyla Horn, Hungarian Foreign Minister, at the meeting of the Hungarian Society of Political Sciences, 20 February 1990.

¹⁰ See Pietsch, p. 11. This statement comes from Hungarian historian Miklos Szabo of the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats).

¹¹ Speech by Andrzej Karkoszka, State Secretary of the Polish Defense Ministry, Vienna, 18 July 1998. ÖIES, "ÖIES-Workshop - 'Die NATO-Erweiterung und die Sicherheit Mitteleuropas", Occasional Paper Nr. 1, Maria-Enzersdorf: ÖIES, 1998.

¹² This goal was mentioned in the official document "Foundations of Polish Policies of National Safeguards" from 1992.

¹³ Ronald Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen, "Building a New NATO" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.4, pp. 28-40.

¹⁴ George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East. Lanham: University Press of America, 1997, p. 38.

¹⁵ Asmus, et al., p.28.

¹⁶ Volker Rühe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 135.

¹⁷ Slovakia was left out of the enlargement round largely due to political reasons and concerns over undemocratic practices of the coalition government led by Prime Minister Vladimír Meiar between 1994-1998. See Marián Leško, "Príbeh sebadiskvalifikácie favorita," (The story of a self-disqualification of a favorite) in Martin Bútora and František Šebej (eds.) Slovensko v šedej zóne? Rozširovanie NATO, zlyhanie a perspektívy Slovenska. (Slovakia in a grey zone? NATO Enlargement, failures and perspectives of Slovakia) Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 1998, pp. 15-85.

¹⁸ On the latest Slovak foreign and security policy developments see Vladimír Biík et al., "Foreign and Security Policy of the Slovak Republic," in Grigorij Mesenikov, Miroslav Kollár and Tom Nicholson (eds.) Slovakia 2000. A Global Report on the State of the Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2000, pp. 233-296.

¹⁹ Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins, "The European Union and NATO enlargement Debates in Comparative Perspective: A Case of Incremental Linkage?" West European Politics, Vol.22, No.3, p. 24.

²⁰ The so called 5+1 countries comprised the first group of negotiating states. These were Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. The second group of five countries was composed of Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria.

²¹ One clear exception to this rule have been specific demarches or common positions adopted directly in relation to one or more candidate countries.

²² David Allen, "Wider but Weaker or the More the Merrier? Enlargement and Foreign Policy Cooperation in the EC/EU" in John Redmond & Glenda Rosenthal (eds.) The Expanding European Union: Past Present and Future. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 107-124.

²³ The Treaty of Nice modified articles 17 and 25 that deal explicitly with the goals and institutional aspects of the CESDP.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Intergovernmental Conference 2000: the Polish Position, 12 June, 2000.

²⁵ This quote comes from Slovakia's official negotiating position on the CFSP chapter.

²⁶ "Klaus: Evropska obrana je klin proti NATO", Lidove Noviny, 4 June 2001.

²⁷ "Europe is still scarred by the Cold War", speech by Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, delivered at a conference of European banks held in Frankfurt.

²⁸ Bartoszewskie's speech in Moscow on "Polish-Russian Relations in the Context of European Union Enlargement", 6 February 2001.

²⁹ Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, approved by the Council of the Slovak Republic on March 27, 2001.

³⁰ These include the following candidate states for EU membership: Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. Albania and Macedonia are the remaining two countries.

³¹ Maartje Rutten (ed.) From St-Malo to Nice. European defense: core documents, Chaillot Paper No. 47, May 2001.

³² See www.msz.gov.pl

³³ Francois Heisbourg et al., European Defence: Making It Work, Challiot Paper No. 42, September 2000.

³⁴ Barbara Lippert and Peter Becker, "Structured Dialogue Revisited: the EU's Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion," European Foreign Affairs, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1998).

³⁵ The EU has signed Stabilization and Association Agreements signed with several Balkan states.

³⁶ See Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999) and Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999).

³⁷ A point emphasized by Eduard Kukan, Slovakia's Foreign Minister, during an international conference Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union, Bratislava, 27-28 October 2000.

³⁸ Alexander Duleba, "Ukraine, Central Europe and Slovakia's Foreign Policy," Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 200), p. 86.

³⁹ Kuchma visited Bratislava between 13-14 June 2001.